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BARGAINING AROUND THE TRIPS




J.H. REICHMAN** AND DAVID LANGE***
I.  INTRODUCTION
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights1 (TRIPS Agreement) establishes a set of universal intel-
lectual property norms2 that all World Trade Organization (WTO)
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1. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Negotia-
tions, April 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]; Agreement on Trade–Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
2. Besides mandating new international minimum standards for patents, copyrights,
trademarks, trade secrets, industrial designs, integrated circuit designs, and other intellectual
property disciplines, the TRIPS Agreement incorporates the Berne and Paris Conventions, and
certain provisions of the Rome Convention on Neighboring Rights and of the Washington
Treaty on integrated circuit designs.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 1(3), 2, 3(1),
9(1), 14, 35; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris, July 24,
1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221; International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers
of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, adopted Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43; Treaty
on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, opened for signature May 26, 1989,
28 I.L.M. 1477.  See generally Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPs: Background, Principles and Gen-
eral Provisions, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT 3 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, eds., 1998); J.H. Reichman, Univer-
sal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPs Component of the
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member states must respect in their domestic laws within prescribed
periods of time.3  Two sets of ancillary norms further buttress the re-
sulting legal infrastructure.  The first of these norms purports to rec-
ognize comparable minimum standards for the enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights within single national systems.4  The second
norm establishes international dispute-settlement machinery that
permits member states in good standing to extract compensatory
damages from other recalcitrant states whose laws or practices are
found to nullify or impair the trade advantages that should otherwise
flow from the TRIPS Agreement.5
The TRIPS Agreement expressly provides certain built-in capa-
bilities that could help to foster a cooperative approach to imple-
menting its obligatory minimum standards.  For example, the Council
for TRIPS could, at least in principle, exercise a mediating role both
with respect to reducing deviations from existing intellectual property
norms and to fashioning a consensus to deal with emerging or candi-
date norms requiring future action.6  In a similar vein, some provi-
sions of the Agreement allow for, or mandate, consultations among
states having different interests, for example, in such thorny areas as
competition law7 or geographical appellations of origin;8 still other
provisions mandate periodic reviews of subjects like biogenetic pat-
enting, where gaps in the law remain to be filled.9  Finally, the dedica-
tion of the WTO’s principal intellectual property officers to pursue
cooperative—rather than coercive—forms of implementation10 con-
WTO Agreement [hereinafter Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards], in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra, at 21.
3. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 65, 66(1).
4. . arts. 41-61.
5. See id. arts. 63, 64; Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter
DSU].
6. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 23(4), 24(2) (mandating that the Coun-
cil for TRIPS will undertake negotiations to facilitate the protection of geographical indications
of wines and spirits) art. 64(3) (requiring the Council to examine complaints and submit its rec-
ommendations to the Ministerial Conference for approval) art. 68 (requiring that the Council
monitor the operation of the TRIPS Agreement and, “in particular, provide any assistance re-
quested by them [member] in the context of dispute settlement procedures”).
7. Id. arts. 40(3), (4).
8. Id. art. 24(1).
9. Id. art. 27(3)(b); see also id., art. 71(1) (“The Council may also undertake reviews in
the light of any relevant new developments which might warrant modification or amendment of
this Agreement.”).
10. See, e.g., id. art. 1(1) (“Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice.”)
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stitutes an intangible factor of considerable importance in estimating
the prospects for success.11
Another built-in factor that favors some degree of cooperative
action is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) high
principle of transparency, carried over from the GATT of 1947,12
which colors the current phase of implementation activities.13  Under
this principle, the WTO Secretariat has been gathering information
from member states concerning their existing intellectual property
laws and planned legislation.14  The various trade representatives will
then evaluate the results of these surveys, with a view to identifying
actual deviations from the agreed standards and other potential
sources of friction, which may be addressed within the Council for
TRIPS or in bilateral discussions.15
The zeal with which the developed countries have thrown them-
selves into this monitoring or “grading” exercise has bred high expec-
tations among rightsholders and their organized representatives.16
There is a widespread belief that, once the transitional deadlines be-
gin to expire, the developing countries will succumb to an evolving
high-protectionist agenda that looks well beyond the TRIPS Agree-
ment itself.17  This euphoria stems, in turn, from the conviction that
art. 43 (emphasizing the need for each Member to provide adequate opportunity for consulta-
tion with each other in the case of a dispute) art. 69 (“Members agree to cooperate with each
other with a view to eliminating international trade in goods infringing intellectual property
rights.”).
11. See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements
of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275
(1997); Adrian Otten [Director, Intellectual Property and Investment Division, WTO] &
Hannu Wager [Legal Affairs Officer, Intellectual Property and Investment Division, WTO],
Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 391, 411-13
(1996) (“It is to be hoped that retaliation remains more of a threat that gives credibility to the
system than anything else.”).
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT 1947]; Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
13. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 63(1).
14. Id. art. 63(2).
15. Id. art. 63(3).
16. For example, copyright industries have credited the establishment of the WTO and
active United States government monitoring for decreasing piracy and for contributing to the
growth of sales and exports.  See Jeffrey Mays, Copyright Industry Rise Tied to Global Markets,
J. COMM., Jan. 4, 1997, at 3A, available in LEXIS, New Library, Majpap File; see also Eric H.
Smith, Worldwide Copyright Protection Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L.  559, 572-78 (1996).
17. See J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the
TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 11, 17-21 (1997) [hereinafter Reichman,
From Free Riders to Fair Followers] (providing a list of new rules and regulations that the
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top-down pressures from governments in powerful developed coun-
tries, coupled with strategic litigation in defense of private
rightsholders before the WTO’s dispute-settlement panels, will suf-
fice to keep the developing countries in line and make it expedient
for them to cooperate fully in the implementation process.18  The out-
come thus envisioned is a worldwide intellectual property system in
which the “rule of law,” once firmly established at the international
level, becomes translated into local action by orderly and effective
means.19
United States and European Union plan to implement in order to heighten protection for in-
tellectual property).  A number of professors and practitioners have voiced their belief that the
WTO will help strengthen protection for intellectual property and bring developing nations
into line with stronger protection.  See, e.g., Paul Edward Geller, Intellectual Property in the
Global Marketplace: Impact of the TRIPS Dispute Settlements?, 29 INT’L LAW. 99, 112-13
(1995); Allen Z. Hertz, Shaping the Trident: Intellectual Property Under NAFTA, Investment
Protection Agreements and the World Trade Organization, 23 CAN-U.S. L.J. 261, 312 (1997)
(“Accordingly, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body will soon be producing decisions which will
be the international IP regime’s first experience in the development of something approximat-
ing ‘case law.’”); Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual
Property Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 769, 783
(1997) (predicting that a higher degree of protection, enforcement, and harmonization will re-
sult from the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement); Karen D. Lee & Silke von Lewinski,
The Settlement of International Disputes in the Field of Intellectual Property, in FROM GATT TO
TRIPS: THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 278, 296 & n.85 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996); Gail E. Evans,
Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue: The Making of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 137 (1994)
(tracing evolution of TRIPS Agreement).
18. For example, the United States prevailed against India in a WTO action claiming that
India had failed to implement certain ancillary measures under the patent provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement.  See WTO Appellate Body Report on U.S. Complaint Concerning India-
Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R
(Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinafter U.S. v. India]; J.H. Reichman, Securing Compliance with the
TRIPS Agreement After U.S. v. India, 1998 J. INT’L ECON. L. 585, 592-97 [hereinafter Reich-
man, Securing Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement After U.S. v. India] (analyzing the impli-
cations of this decision).  Pressure from the multinational companies behind the TRIPS
Agreement will not be confined to developing countries, which nonetheless remain the princi-
ple target.  For example, in the case of Ireland’s copyright law, the United States threatened to
bring a complaint to the WTO against what it viewed as Ireland’s weak copyright laws. See
Dennis Kelleher, US Pressure Forces Copyright Crackdown: Ireland Is Under Pressure to
Strengthen Copyright Law, IRISH TIMES, June 8, 1988, at 16, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Majpap File; John Zaracostas, US Withdraws Complaint Over Irish Piracy Rules, J. COMM.,
Feb. 24, 1998, at 3A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File.  In order to avoid pro-
ceedings at the WTO, Ireland engaged in bilateral discussions with the United States and came
to an agreement that ensured that Ireland would change its copyright laws.  See id.
19. See Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International Trade
Relations, 17 J. INTL. L. BUS. 775, 805 (1997); Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dis-
pute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Government, 90 AM. J. INT’L
L. 193 (1996); see also supra note 17.
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The authors of this Article do not share this rosy view of the en-
suing implementation process.  We believe that there are multiple
factors tending to encourage non-cooperative behavior by developing
countries during the implementation phase, some of which were
clearly evidenced during the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion’s (WIPO) Conference on Copyright and Certain Related Ques-
tions held in December 1996,20 and that these factors outweigh those
likely to induce more cooperative attitudes. In a climate of non-
cooperation, moreover, we believe that the developing countries will
have abundant opportunities to resist and undermine the “rule of
law” in subtle ways that will evoke difficulties that the developed
countries previously experienced under the Paris and Berne Conven-
tions.21  If we are right, the many structural impediments to imple-
menting the “rule of law” that are identified in Part II of this Article
could significantly elevate the social costs of building the new inter-
national intellectual property system for all concerned, and could di-
minish the benefits that rightsholders currently expect from the
TRIPS Agreement. 22
To avoid such a negative outcome, we believe that the relevant
interest groups in both developed and developing countries should
20. See generally Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT’L L.
369 (1997).
21. Cf. Frederick M. Abbott, The New Global Technology Regime: The WTO TRIPS
Agreement and Global Economic Development, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 385, 399 (1996)
(predicting that developing countries will “continue to resist changes to their Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (IPR) laws, and when they do make changes, they will be slow to enforce them in
favor of foreign enterprises”); Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Informa-
tion in a Global Economy, 27 GEO. WASH.  J. INT’L L. & ECON. 327, 343-344 (1993) (observing
that intellectual property laws are often manipulated to the disadvantage of a foreign appli-
cant); John E. Giust, Noncompliance with TRIPs by Developed and Developing Countries: Is
TRIPS Working?  8 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 69, 70 (1997) (“Despite its clear mandates,
both developing and developed countries have been imperfect in enacting TRIPS-compliant
legislation.”); J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures of the TRIPS Agreement,
37 VA. J. INT’L L. 335, 356 (1997) [hereinafter Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Proce-
dures] (“First, if the developed countries push too hard and too fast, the developing and the
least-developed countries will find ways to push back.”).
22. Compare Lisa S. Klainman, Applying GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures to a
Trade-in-Services Agreement: Proceed with Caution, 11 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 657 (1990)
(favoring a flexible, less legal approach to dispute settlement), with Miguel Montañà i Mori, A
GATT With Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 103, 128-36 (1993) (favoring a strong, rule of law approach).  See
also Judith H. Bello, Some Practical Observations About WTO Settlement of Intellectual Prop-
erty Disputes, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 357 (1997) (pointing out weaknesses in the WTO dispute set-
tlement system, discussing problems that arise from having governments rather than private
parties arbitrate the dispute, and observing the need for more neutral approaches to dispute
settlement than that provided by the WTO system).
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consider treating the TRIPS Agreement as a set of default rules to be
bargained around within a cooperative framework that removes im-
pediments to the “rule of law” on a transactional basis and that seeks
to maximize gains for participating rightsholders on a case-by-case
approach.  In other words, we see the need to establish an opera-
tional framework outside of the TRIPS Agreement’s own institu-
tional machinery that would be conducive to “unofficial” cooperative
strategies likely to produce win-win results for both public and pri-
vate actors, regardless of the tensions that the TRIPS implementation
process otherwise may generate among WTO member states.
Most developing countries regulate economic development ei-
ther through administrative and consultative organs that influence
the pace and direction of private enterprise or through state entities
that participate directly in commercial activities.  A cooperative
strategy can succeed only with the tacit approval and support of these
bodies.23  Hence, we propose “public-private initiatives” to facilitate
transnational intellectual property deal-making and to improve the
climate for enhanced foreign investment in the developing countries.
The success of the venture requires that state organs participate in
these initiatives as “economic actors” engaging with private actors to
achieve specified commercial results, and not as “political actors” re-
sponding to normative pressures or to the corresponding need to
formulate official intellectual property policies.24
In what follows, we explain in greater detail both the need for a
cooperative approach along the lines outlined above and a means of
implementing it through ongoing public-private initiatives promoted
by the International Forum for Intellectual Property Initiatives at the
Duke Law School’s Center for Global Information Technologies.
We illustrate how the Forum has facilitated negotiations between
private companies and representatives of the Chinese government,
leading toward particular or specific transactional outcomes.  We end
by emphasizing the potential short- and medium-term benefits of this
approach for the international intellectual property system as a
whole.
23. Cf. HILTON L. ROOT, SMALL COUNTRIES: BIG LESSONS: GOVERNANCE AND THE RISE
OF EAST ASIA passim (1996) (discussing the role of particular governments in the economic
development of countries in East Asia and demonstrating the importance of good government
administration in strengthening the economy).
24. Cf. Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph
over Diplomats, 29 INT’L L. 389 (1995) (arguing that for disputes to be resolved, state involve-
ment must be depoliticized).
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II.  THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AS A NON-COOPERATIVE
GAME
Viewed as a whole, the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade ne-
gotiations succeeded largely because the developing countries were
offered greater access to markets for traditional manufactured goods
and for their agricultural products in exchange for codified obliga-
tions to respect intellectual property rights in the nontraditional
products and processes that are the stock in trade of the technology-
exporting countries.25  While the premises underlying this “package
deal” make economic sense in a long-term perspective, apologists for
the TRIPS Agreement have largely papered over the extent to which
its elevated standards of intellectual property protection reflect the
interests of high-tech producers at the expense of users and consum-
ers generally, and especially of those in technology-importing coun-
tries.26  The short-term social costs that most of these countries are
destined to incur even under the most optimistic scenarios stem
largely from the need to purchase essential goods and services, in-
cluding food, medicines, and high-tech components of new industrial
projects, on the global market for legitimate goods covered by intel-
lectual property rights rather than on the shrinking market for coun-
terfeit or copied substitutes.27
25. See Abbott, supra note 21, at 387-88 (listing the bargaining chips used as including the
reduction of subsidies for agriculture in industrialized nations, concessions with respect to im-
ports of tropical products, the phasing out of quotas of textile products, substantial transition
periods, incentives to transfer technology, and compulsory licensing).  See generally Frederick
M. Abbot, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property Negotiations
in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689 (1989) (providing a
thorough history of the negotiating history and objectives of the TRIPS Agreement); Evans,
supra note 17 (historical view from Australian perspective).
26. See How Changes in Treaties Affect the Consumer, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malay.), May
11, 1997, at 16, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File (citing Dr. Benoit De Nayer at
the Sixth International Conference on Consumer Law, who argues that the IP system often
negatively affects consumers in terms of price, choice, and redress mechanisms).  But see Intel-
lectual Property and Trade: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-53
(1986) (statement of Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy
and Analysis) (arguing that weak protection undermines free trade and hurts consumers).
27. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
(UNCTAD), THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 15-20, 30-32, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/1, U.N. Sales No. 96.II.D.10 (1996) (“Costs and Benefits Stemming from
the TRIPS Agreement”) [hereinafter TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES]; WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO), GLOBALIZATION AND ACCESS TO DRUGS -- IMPLICATIONS
OF THE WTO/TRIPS AGREEMENT at 11-35, WHO/DAP/98.9, Geneva Switzerland, (Nov.
1997); Giunta & Shang, supra note 21, at 331 (“[L]ax protection offers economic benefits to
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To be sure, the burden of these added social costs will vary from
one country to the next, and in some countries may be significantly
reduced by countervailing gains from factors such as augmenting for-
eign investment, growing participation in the networked supply
strategies of transnational corporations,28 and the increasing ability of
local innovators to achieve import substitution or to realize export
potential.29  Nevertheless, the knowledge gap separating advanced
from developing countries remains a cardinal fact of international
economic life, and so long as the former remain willing and able to
invest disproportionately greater resources in basic and applied sci-
ence than the rest of the world, the gap will persist for the foresee-
able future.30  A comparative disadvantage with respect to trade in
knowledge goods will, in turn, compel most developing and least-
developed countries to adopt defensive strategies for implementing
the TRIPS Agreement, to reduce its resulting social costs and ten-
sions, even as they strive to maximize their gains from the WTO
Agreement as a whole.31
A. Structural Barriers on the Road to the “Rule of Law”
The need to minimize the social costs of higher standards of in-
ternational intellectual property protection will give developing and
least-developed countries strong incentives to behave strategically in
a manner that has typified the response of both large and small coun-
tries to international trade agreements in the past.32  Of course, even
developing nations.  Because pirates of intellectual property incur minimal production costs
and no royalty payments, they are in a better position than legitimate producers to satisfy de-
mands in developing countries.”).
28. See, e.g., TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 27, at 16; J.H. Reichman,
From Free Riders to Fair Followers, supra note 17, at 87-88; Keith E. Maskus & Denise Eby
Konan, Trade-Related Issues and Exploratory Results, in ANALYTICAL AND NEGOTIATING
ISSUES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 401, 409-16, 439-40 (Alan V. Deardorff & Robert
M. Stern eds. 1994).
29. See Robert Sherwood, The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries,
37 IDEA 491, 493 (1997) [hereinafter Sherwood, Implications for Developing Countries].
30. See generally Brian F. Fitzgerald, Trade Based Constitutionalism: The Framework for
Universalizing Substantive International Law?, 5 Y.B. OF INT’L L. 111 (1996/97); see also Ab-
bott, supra note 21, at 395-396.
31. See Fitzgerald, supra note 30, at 152 (predicting that the high demands of TRIPS will
not be met by developing nations because of economic hardship); Abbott, supra note 21,
(predicting passive resistance to TRIPS by developing countries and the use of domestic tax
policy to counterbalance TRIPS requirements).
32. See William P. Alford, How Theory Does – And Does Not – Matter: American Ap-
proaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 20-21 (1994)
(observing East Asian resistance to strengthening intellectual property rights in response to
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the developed countries may adopt defensive strategies of their own
if the TRIPS Agreement turns out to pinch important sectors of their
economies, but these temptations are circumscribed by the need to
set a good example for the less-advanced countries.33  In the latter
countries, short- and medium-term needs to limit the adverse effects
of the TRIPS Agreement will become pervasive, and the resulting ef-
forts seem likely to engender certain recurring patterns of behavior.
In particular, these countries are likely to exploit ambiguities in the
international legal standards;34 to adopt countervailing regulatory
measures, especially measures sounding in competition law;35 to de-
vote minimum resources to enforcing intellectual property laws of
primary interest to foreign rightsholders;36 and to invoke safeguards
embodied in the TRIPS Agreement to counteract some of the hard-
ship the Agreement may cause.37
1. Exploiting Normative Ambiguities.  The prohibitions of the
TRIPS Agreement are clearest and likely to be most effective when
they bear on clumsy infringers of its specified intellectual property
rights.38  In this context, the Agreement’s minimum standards of
pressure from the United States).
33. Cf.  Ernesto M. Hizon, The Safeguard Measure/VER Dilemma: The Jekyll and Hyde of
Trade Protection, 15 J. INT’L L. BUS. 105, 130 (1994) (asserting that the WTO will only work if
the more economically wealthy members exercise restraint); Andy Shoyer, No Dispute: The
WTO Works, J. COMM., Dec. 18, 1997, at 6A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File
(suggesting that the United States and E.U. should continue to comply with the WTO, since
lesser developed countries will soon be “held responsible for safeguarding” intellectual prop-
erty rights).
34. See Abbot, supra note 21; Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 11, passim; J.H. Reich-
man, From Free Riders to Fair Followers, supra note 17, 26-86 (discussing loopholes in the
TRIPS Agreement and advising developing countries to exploit them in a procompetitive
manner); see also discussion infra Part A.1 (discussing normative ambiguities in the intellectual
property regime).
35. See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 40(2) (“Nothing in this agreement shall prevent Mem-
bers from specifying in their legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particular
cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition
in the relevant market.”).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 119-44.
37. See TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 7, 8; see also discussion infra p. 45 and accompanying
notes (explaining how developing countries may use these articles).
38. See Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent Provisions
in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 517, 530-32
(1996) (arguing that Indian pharmaceutical industry will benefit more from patent protection
under TRIPS than from free-riding practices of the past); Mays, supra note 16, (reporting ob-
servations from copyright industries that piracy was generally down).  Also, countries such as
Thailand, in coming into accord with the TRIPS Agreement, have reported better enforcement
procedures and greater success at seizing pirated materials.  See Ron Corben, State Department:
Thai Anti-Piracy Effort Not Enough; Infringements Called Key Bilateral Issue, J. COMM., June
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intellectual property protection inhibit free-riders from continuing to
engage in wholesale duplication of vulnerable knowledge goods
without making any corresponding investment of their own.39  The
Agreement should thus constitute a powerful weapon against the
kind of “piratical” conduct that the early negotiations aimed to
repress.40
Over the course of the negotiations, however, as Professor
Hanns Ullrich has recently demonstrated, the drafters found it expe-
dient to pursue a far more ambitious goal.41  They tried to establish a
worldwide intellectual property system that both promoted the global
interests of the technology-exporting countries, and immunized these
interests from disruptive exercises of the territorial sovereignty that
had been formally guaranteed to Contracting Parties by Article XX
(d) of GATT.42  The drafters sought to attain these goals by means of
a sweeping harmonization of international intellectual property stan-
dards at relatively high, rather than minimum levels, and by estab-
lishing detailed enforcement standards that domestic authorities must
follow, which have no parallel in the pre-existing international con-
ventions.43
Despite the legislative successes embodied in the text of the
TRIPS Agreement, the drafters’ ambitious goals remain imperfectly
achieved, because of the still rudimentary institutional infrastructure
of the international intellectual property system,44 and the system’s
26, 1998, at 4A, available in LEXIS News Library, Majpap File.  In 1997, seizures in Thailand
tripled from 168,000 to 568,000.  See id.  The rate of software piracy in Israel dropped to 54% in
1997, from 69% a year earlier.  See Nina Gilbert, BSA: Piracy Down to 54%, THE JERUSALEM
POST, June 22, 1998, at 19, available in LEXIS News Library, Majpap File.  For example, as
part of its obligations under TRIPS, Singapore has passed stricter laws, making it an offence to
possess equipment used to pirate copyrighted goods.  See Copyright Law Gets More Bite
Against Piracy, THE STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), February 20, 1998, at 28, available in LEXIS News
Library, Majpap File.
39. See, e.g., Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad:
Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273 (1991); David Hartridge & Arvind
Subramanian, Intellectual Property Rights: The Issues in GATT, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
893, 895-96 (1989).
40. See U.S. Framework Proposal to GATT Concerning Intellectual Property Rights, 4
INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1371 (Nov. 4, 1987).
41. See Hanns Ullrich, TRIPS: Adequate Protection, Inadequate Trade, Adequate Compe-
tition Policy, in ANTITRUST: A NEW INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDY? 184-93 (John O. Ha-
ley & Hiroshi Iyori eds., 1995).
42. See GATT 1947, supra note 12, art. XX(d) (carried over into GATT 1994, supra note
12, as modified by TRIPS Agreement); Ullrich, supra note 41, at 180-81.
43. See Ullrich, supra note 41, at 180-81; infra text accompanying notes 119-21..
44. See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 11, at 292-93 (noting that there is no legislative
check or balance on dispute resolution in the WTO); Giunta & Shang, supra note 21, at 338
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corresponding dependence on the cooperation of national systems
for its day-to-day activities.45  Only in some cases, and after the ex-
haustion of local remedies, will it prove possible to invoke the dis-
pute-settlement machinery of the WTO Agreement,46 and for reasons
explained below, the effectiveness of this machinery remains to be
seen.  In most cases, the implementation of the entire TRIPS regime
will in fact depend on the cooperation of domestic legislatures,
courts, and administrative or consultative agencies, whose tactics or
decisions will continue to have far-reaching, extraterritorial effects.47
When, for example, second-comers borrow from pre-existing in-
novations while adding some value of their own to the final product,
even if only in the form of price reductions, the level of protection
available to foreign rightsholders will vary considerably from one in-
tellectual property subculture to another.  In addition, the protection
will vary from one jurisdiction to another, even with respect to the
same legal subculture.48  This follows because, by and large, the
TRIPS Agreement declines to regulate either the scope of protection
issues as such or the permissible range of exceptions to, and limita-
tions on, the exclusive property rights whose transnational recogni-
tion it otherwise secures.49
(“While the TRIPS Agreement provides for specific enforcement mechanisms, including in-
junctions, damages and methods of obtaining evidence, it remains unclear how stringently these
new provisions will be enforced.”); cf. also J.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-
Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475, 479 (1993) (suggesting that the TRIPS Agreement may be
bogged down by an “obsolete and increasingly dysfunctional institutional framework”).
45. See, e.g., U.S. v. India, supra note 18; JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 341 (2d ed. 1997);
Croley & Jackson, supra note 19.
46. See generally Bello, supra note 22 (describing the difficulties for United States parties).
47. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 45, at 99 (outlining the impact of
national constitutions on the trading system); Timothy G. Ackerman, Comment: Dis’ordre’ly
Loopholes: TRIPS Patent Protection, GATT and the ECJ, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 489, 492 (1997)
(noting that interpretations will vary on TRIPS art. 27(2), which allows states to exclude certain
inventions from patenting); Martine de Koning, Why the Coercion-Based GATT Approach Is
Not the Only Answer to International Piracy in the Asia-Pacific Region, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 59 (1997).
48. See Michael Lehmann, TRIPs, The Berne Convention, and Legal Hybrids, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 2621, 2626 (1994) (noting how different jurisdictions define the term “technology”);
J.H. Reichman, The Know-How Gap in the TRIPS Agreement: Why Software fared Badly, and
What are the Solutions, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 763, 765 (1995) [hereinafter Reich-
man, Know-How Gap in TRIPS] (stressing that “both the strengths and weaknesses of the
TRIPS Agreement stem from its essentially backwards-looking character.”).
49. See J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT’s Uruguay Round: Competi-
tive Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171, 173-81 (1993).
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These issues remain controversial even in the developed coun-
tries, and no harmonizing consensus has yet emerged at the interna-
tional level.50  Relevant decisions in single cases may thus depend
upon territorial adaptations of existing but widely varying state prac-
tices,51 and the decision-makers in developing countries will logically
favor those practices that seem most favorable to their own, often
shifting interests.52  In the absence of either an emerging consensus or
of some clarifying posterior international legislation, such as the re-
cently adopted WIPO treaties concerning the application of copy-
rights and related rights to networked environments,53 the WTO’s
Appellate Body seems unlikely to challenge these exercises of resid-
ual sovereignty in dispute settlement cases, except when the end re-
sult appears clearly to contradict an express provision of the TRIPS
Agreement.54
The uncertain treatment of computer software in international
intellectual property law after the TRIPS Agreement is a case in
point that has recently attracted scholarly attention.  There is no
doubt that unauthorized wholesale duplication of copyrightable com-
puter programs should soon trigger judicial sanctions nearly every-
where, and the customs authorities in WTO member states should in-
creasingly bar entry to these illegal products.55  However, copyright
laws seldom apply in the absence of wholesale duplication because
courts tend to regard the innovator’s most commercially valuable
components as functionally determined ideas or processes that are
not protectable as expressive “works of authorship.”56  Copyright
50. See id. at 29-52.
51. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 61 and accompanying text (providing an example of
how the level of protection for  computer software varies by country); see also Curtis A. Brad-
ley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 509
(1997).
52. See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 11, at 296 (observing that without a ‘best rule’
policy, each country will tailor intellectual property law to its own needs).
53. See World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20,
1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/94, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997); WIPO Perform-
ances and Phonograms Treaty, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/95, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76
(1997).  See generally Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright
Treaty on TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 441 (1997).
54. See U.S. v. India, supra note 18.
55. See discussion supra note 38 (providing examples of increased vigilance against piracy
in developing nations); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 51-60.
56. See Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A Mani-
festo Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2356-
65 (1994).  See also, e.g., Fonar Corp. v. Magnetic Resonance PLUS, Inc., 920 F. Supp 508, 514
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Whether a party can maintain a copyright infringement action involving
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laws and the domestic trade secret laws also leave wide room for sec-
ond-comers to reverse-engineer both protected and unprotected
components of computer programs, provided that the underlying
technical solutions thus revealed are independently re-implemented
and coded.57  The extent to which patent law can or should take up
the slack is hotly debated, and state practice varies from a virtually
complete acceptance of computer programs as patentable subject
matter, on a par with other fields of endeavor, to a virtually complete
denial of eligibility.58
Given this uncertainty, the developing countries remain free to
pick and choose from among the diverse legal options that respect-
able state practice makes available, with a view to implementing a
normative framework that best suits the capabilities of their own
software industries.59  The same is true with respect to biogenetic en-
gineering,60 electronic databases,61 and other promising information
technologies that the TRIPS Agreement leaves largely unregulated.62
Until subsequent legislation clarifies the picture, including the new
computer software will often hinge on the extent to which the protectable elements of the
copyrighted work have been copied.  Indeed, even if defendants engaged in unrestrained
copying of a plaintiff’s work, plaintiff would still be obligated to show that elements that consti-
tuted protected expression had been infringed.”).
57. See Reichman, Know-How Gap in TRIPS, supra note 48, at 779-84; see also Sega En-
ters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., No. 92-15655, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78, at *93 (9th Cir. Jan. 6,
1993) (“[W]here disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements
embodied in a copyrighted computer program and where there is a legitimate reason for seek-
ing such access, disassembly is a fair use of a copyrighted work.”)
58. See generally Jurgen Betten, Patentability of Software in Europe: The German Per-
spective, 13 NO. 8 COMPUTER LAW 1 (1996) (comparing the German Patent Office approach to
software with the European Patent Office); Sean J. Hackett, Patent Protection in Europe for
Software Inventions, 479 PLI/PAT 889 (1997) (comparing the approach of the United States to
that of Europe).
59. See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 11, at 296.
60. See John Zarocostas, Stronger Biotech Patent Rules Urged, J. COMM., Apr. 3, 1998, at
3A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File (reporting the statements of Bruce
Lehman, United States commissioner for patents and trademarks, that the TRIPS Agreement
is “a bit unclear” on biotechnology and calling for stronger protection of biotechnology pat-
ents); Joseph Straus, Patenting Human Genes in Europe – Past Developments and Prospects for
the Future, 26 INT’L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 920 (1995); Dan L. Burk, Bio-
technology and Patent Law: Fitting Innovation to the Procrustean Bed, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L. J. 1, 24-71 (1991).
61. See generally J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in
Data, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997).
62. See Thomas Cottier, The New Global Technology Regime: The Impact of New Tech-
nologies on Multilateral Trade Regulation and Governance, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 415, 426
(1996) (observing the novel legal nature of certain new technologies, including communication
networks).
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WIPO treaties that will begin to regulate the use of copyrightable
works in networked environments, private parties will increasingly
stipulate their own contractual rules to fill the gaps in existing intel-
lectual property systems.  Governments will, in turn, have to deter-
mine how to regulate these contractual exercises, and much will de-
pend on the extent to which they subject private contracts concerning
information goods to public interest limitations that may or may not
parallel those of classical intellectual property laws.63
Even with respect to more traditional technologies that the
TRIPS Agreement directly covers, recent studies show that existing,
unharmonized ambiguities concerning the applicable international
standards will leave the developing countries ample “wiggle room” in
which to forge pro-competitive strategies of their own.  The authors
do not have the space in this article to track these ambiguities in de-
tail, and the authors refer the reader to the increasingly detailed lit-
erature on this subject.64  Nevertheless, this literature clearly suggests
that the end results may deviate considerably from the high-
protectionist aspirations of foreign rightsholders.
The authors predict, indeed, that once entrepreneurs in any
given developing country adopt a “fair followers’” mentality in place
of the free-riding tactics outlawed by the TRIPS Agreement, it will
be harder to determine just where that country’s true economic in-
terests really lie within the available range of more or less protec-
tionist legal options than to navigate around the international mini-
mum standards themselves.65  One constant source of difficulty in this
regard is that the international minimum standards will affect differ-
ent sectors of any given country’s economy in different ways.  For ex-
ample, such fine-tuning can harm the capacity of some local firms to
attract foreign investments or enter into alliances with foreign com-
63. See generally J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual
Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, U.
PA. L. REV. (forthcoming, April 1999); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Pre-emption: The Law and
Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1999).
64. See Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers, supra note 17, at 28 (stating that
“the TRIPS Agreement leaves developing countries ample ‘wiggle room’ in which to imple-
ment national policies favoring the public interest in free competition”); Paul Edward Geller,
Legal Transplants in International Copyright: Some Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J. 199, 216 (1994) (discussing the problem of interpretation); Sherwood, Implications for De-
veloping Countries, supra note 29, (noting that the TRIPS Agreement is “an illogical package
of disparate concepts”); A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS - Natural Rights and a Polite Form of Eco-
nomic Imperialism, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 415 (1996).  But see Reich, supra note 19, at
804 (arguing that the WTO provides uniform and binding legal interpretations).
65. See Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards, supra note 2, at 91.
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panies, even as it enhances the capacity of other firms operating in
the same sector to improve their own innovative capabilities.66
Moreover, states cannot overindulge in normative fine-tuning with-
out running up against the constraints on national treatment, which
the TRIPS Agreement has reinforced.67
Striking an appropriate balance between the incentives to create
and the need to preserve healthy levels of free competition within pa-
rameters set by the TRIPS Agreement will not be easy for the devel-
oping countries,68 whose needs keep changing from one decade to the
next; it is a task that will require constant and refined economic
monitoring.69  As higher levels of intellectual property protection
produce different economic effects on different national actors, the
resulting tensions could paralyze the government’s ability to mediate
between those who stand to benefit and those who stand to lose.  In
India’s pharmaceutical sector, for example, big firms already capable
of profiting from the international patent system find themselves at
odds with small but successful generic drug producers, who have been
resisting the adoption of tougher patent laws.70  The success of the In-
dian generic drug trade also constitutes a beacon to pharmaceutical
companies in other developing countries who see their prospects for
emulation diminished by higher patent standards both at home and in
third-world export markets.71
The need for each developing country to strike a different bal-
ance between intellectual property protection and free competition in
the post-TRIPS milieu thus hampers the drive for further harmoniza-
tion of intellectual property laws in the immediate future.72  Because
66. See infra note 70 and accompanying text (providing the illustrative example of the
patenting of pharmaceuticals in India).
67. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 3 (national treatment), 4 (MFN); see also
Gail E. Evans, The Principle of National Treatment and the International Protection of Indus-
trial Property, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 149, 156-60 (1996).
68. It has been a difficult task even for countries that have established antitrust and intel-
lectual property regimes.  See Eleanor M. Fox, Trade, Competition and Intellectual Property –
TRIPS and its Antitrust Counterparts, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 481, 486-87 (1996).
69. See TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 27, at 21-22.
70. See generally Adelman & Baldia, supra note 38; Le-Nhung McLeland & J. Herbert
O’Toole, Patent Systems in Less Developed Countries: The Cases of India and the Andean Pact
Countries, 2  J.L. & TECH. 229 (1987).
71. Cf. Adelman & Baldia, supra note 38, at 530-31; Mark Ritchie et al., Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights and Biodiversity: The Industrialization of Natural Resources and Traditional Knowl-
edge, 11 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 431, 434 (1996) (noting that Brazil and Argentina, like India,
have fought against altering the national intellectual property laws to conform with the TRIPS
Agreement in regard to pharmaceutical patents).
72. See Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers, supra note 17, at 18-25; Abbott,
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most developing countries will find it both logical and expedient to
favor a minimalist or pro-competitive strategy for implementing the
TRIPS standards, they will tend to postpone many hard decisions to
future rounds of negotiations at both the domestic and international
levels.73  This approach could even win them the support of small and
medium-sized firms in the developed countries, which might other-
wise have to fend off the multinational corporations’ high-
protectionist tactics by themselves, without help from strategic allies
in the global marketplace.74
A minimalist approach to implementing the TRIPS standards is
fully consistent with the economic logic underlying periodic rounds of
multilateral trade negotiations within the ambit of the GATT, and
now, the WTO legal framework.75  As Professor Cottier recognized
early on, the shift away from WIPO as the primary negotiating forum
has made it ever less likely that developing countries will contem-
plate concessions in the field of intellectual property law without ob-
taining corresponding gains in market access for their more tradi-
tional exports.76  While the developed countries exercise considerable
leverage in such negotiations because of the sheer size of their mar-
kets,77 they are still digesting the results of both the Uruguay Round
supra note 21, at 392.
73. See Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards, supra note 2, at 25.  The current eco-
nomic crisis in Asia has led countries such as Malaysia to propose approaches to trade liberali-
zation that are contrary to the WTO’s multilateral approach.  The Asian countries argue that
the WTO’s proposals are impractical and that developing countries are not in a position to dis-
cuss further negotiations.  See Fauziah Ismail, Push for Sectoral Route to Free Trade, NEW
STRAITS TIMES (Malay.), May 13, 1998, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File.
74. For example, a small pharmaceutical company in India may have more in common
with small U.S. companies in the same sector than with the major Indian pharmaceutical con-
cerns.  Cf. Adelman & Baldia, supra note 38, at 526.  In Malaysia, major software companies
like Microsoft are reportedly fighting to prevent parallel imports, while smaller companies, in-
cluding distribution companies, profit from parallel import business.  See Ferina Manecksha,
Microsoft’s New Move Against Software Piracy, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malay.), Jul. 16, 1988, at
6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File.
75. See generally JACKSON, supra note 45, at 73-78, 139-55.
76. Thomas Cottier, The Prospects for Intellectual Property in GATT, in THE NEW GATT
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 414 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Mein-
hard Hilf eds., 1991); see also John Zarocostas, Developing Nations Stand Firm at WTO, J.
COMM., Sept. 18, 1996, at 1A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File (reporting that
representatives from Asia and Latin America promised to strengthen protection for intellectual
property only if developed nations expanded market access to clothing and textiles).
77. See Abbott, supra note 21, at 389 (explaining that developing nations signed the
TRIPS Agreement, in part, because of their need to access developed countries’ markets, and
the former “could have ill afforded the potential result of more restricted access to major indus-
trialized markets.”).  In 1994 (when the Uruguay Round was concluded), the United States
market already absorbed between one-fifth and one-third of each Asian country’s global ex-
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and other regional trade agreements and could not readily grant the
developing countries still greater market access without experiencing
more political turmoil than they can handle at the moment.78  By the
same token, the developing countries already have much too much
on their intellectual property “plates” to contemplate negotiations on
new initiatives, regardless of the gaps in world intellectual property
law that still need to be filled.79
Meanwhile, nothing impedes developing-country governments
from encouraging privately negotiated concessions to foreign firms
that are contractually exchanged for reciprocal benefits to their own
firms or to specific economic sectors,80 provided that both the Most
Favored Nation (MFN)81 and national treatment82 clauses of the
TRIPS Agreement are duly respected.  Private concessions vetted on
a case-by-case basis within a minimalist normative framework would
provide governments with a practical means of empirically ascer-
taining the appropriate balance between legal incentives to innovate
and free competition in particular sectors of their economies.
In so doing, developing-country governments may find that the
growing dynamism of their own internal markets provides them with
a degree of leverage they do not enjoy in multilateral negotiations
between sovereign states, and this leverage may prove particularly
useful in stimulating foreign investment under agreed conditions.
ports.  See Sam Jameson, The Asia Boom; China Sets the Pace as Cash, Concrete Pour into
World’s Hottest Economic Region, L. A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Majpap File.
78. Cf. James T. Madore, WNY Has Winners, Losers Under GATT; Assembly-Line Op-
erations Could be in Danger if They Don’t Boost Productivity, THE BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 19,
1993, at 11, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap file (reporting that the textile and ap-
parel industry, two of the most protected industries in America before the Uruguay Round, will
suffer losses, and quoting a representative from the AFL-CIO calling the GATT
“goobledygook”).
79. See Frances Williams, Developing Nations: Fostering Interdependence, FIN. TIMES,
May 18, 1998, at 6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File (“Though ideological oppo-
sition to compliance in these areas is waning, it [TRIPS] has resulted in an onerous burden of
obligations in terms of new legislation, trade policy notifications and presence at WTO meet-
ings, which many developing countries are struggling to cope with.”).
80.  See Patrick Cohendet et al., Technological Learning, Economic Networks and Innova-
tion Appropriability, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE DYNAMICS OF
CONSTRUCTED ADVANTAGE: THE DYNAMICS OF CONSTRUCTED ADVANTAGE 66, 67-68
(Dominique Foray & Christopher Freeman eds., 1993); Carlos M. Correa, Trends in Technol-
ogy Transfer: Implications for Developing Countries, 21 SCI. & PUB. POLICY 369, 377-79 (1994)
(U.K.).
81. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4.
82. Id. art. 3.
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Because foreign firms want access to these markets,83 they will be
willing to trade specific benefits for specific privileges and guarantees
on a transactional basis, even when state-to-state negotiations fail to
harmonize normative standards or to improve the overall level of en-
forcement.
2. Countervailing Regulatory Measures.  Since the collapse of
the command economies in the former socialist republics of eastern
Europe, the developing countries have increasingly encouraged free
enterprise in more open markets and emphasized the need to attract
direct or indirect foreign investments to these markets.84  Whether
this liberalizing trend will persist over time or merely constitutes a
passing phase subject to dirigiste counter measures, as occurred in the
past, remains to be seen.  Despite recent setbacks, the relative eco-
nomic successes of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs), espe-
cially those of East Asia, has reinforced the trend toward market-
driven reforms, although even here some studies suggest that the
critical role of what Hilton Root calls “good governance” in achiev-
ing this success subtly limits the general applicability of the free-
market model to other developing countries.85  In any event, the con-
tinuing dependence of these countries on foreign technology and in-
vestments has renewed interest in competition law as a tool for
regulating the conduct of multinational firms in more open econo-
mies, with a view to ensuring that their short-term contributions to
growth remain consistent with the host countries’ overall economic
policies.86
83. For example, 50% of multinational corporations expect foreign direct investment in
developing countries to grow by 20% per year until 2001.  See David Crane, Multinationals are
Gaining, United Nations Report Says, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 22, 1997, at C2, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File.  In 1996 China received $42 billion in foreign investment,
while Mexico received $6.4 billion.  See Foo Choy Peng, Report Lists Market Size as Key Lure
for Business; China Eclipses US as Favourite Overseas Investment Destination, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Apr. 11, 1997, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File.
84. See TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 27, at 7-22.  Since the collapse
of communism, Eastern European economies have also enjoyed stronger growth. See Frances
Williams, Eastern Europe Investment Grows Strongly, FIN. TIMES, July. 17, 1996, at 4, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File.
85. See ROOT, supra note 23, at 145 (noting that the definition of “good governance” is
complex, but that “[i]t must give equal account to the particular and the universal.  The abstract
and the concrete must be blended.  Leadership must be balanced by institutions.  Accountabil-
ity by autonomy.  Transparency by respect for the proprietary nature of information.  Democ-
racy by meritocracy.”).
86. Cf. Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of Intellec-
tual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 138-39 (1993) (suggesting that developing
countries should adhere to policies that afford protection to foreign firms willing to participate
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Competition law remains cumbersome and controversial even as
applied in most developed countries, however, and these theoretical
and practical difficulties are greatly compounded when this body of
law is invoked to limit the exercise of intellectual property rights.87
Because such rights constitute short-term restraints on competition
that states grant with a view to enhancing the level of competition
later on,88 the corrective role of competition law, if any, becomes ob-
jectively difficult to assess within national innovation systems.89  In an
international context, where the harmonization of intellectual prop-
erty rights can mask the erection of legal and economic barriers to
entry that may retard the developing countries’ efforts to improve
their own technical capabilities, the corrective role of competition
law becomes even more problematic.90  On the one hand, the devel-
oping countries may legitimately seek to correct anti-competitive
practices stemming from any abuse of market power that the grant of
exclusive intellectual property rights seems to aggravate.91  On the
other hand, overzealous resort to the rules of competition law in this
area, as in others, breeds uncertainty and can reduce incentives for
firms to invest in a reforming economy.92
Typically, a conflict between intellectual property law and com-
petition law arises when states suspect that rightsholders have used
their market power either to extend intellectual property rights be-
yond explicit or implicit statutory limits or to achieve other anticom-
petitive objectives not associated with the normal exercise of such
rights.93  In these cases, the rightsholders may have “abused” or
in local technology transfer programs).  See generally TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
supra note 27, at 53-57; Pedro Roffe, Control of Anti-Competitive Practices in Contractual Li-
censes Under the TRIPS Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE, supra note 2, at 261.
87. See generally Diane P. Wood, Regulation in the Single Global Market: From Anarchy
to World Federalism, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 297 (1996) (arguing that competition rules should
not, as of yet, be internationalized); Ullrich, supra note 41, at 153-209.
88. See Michael Lehmann, The Theory of Property Rights and the Protection of Intellectual
and Industrial Property, 16 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 525, 537 (1985).
89. For example, large drug companies have blamed competition law for discouraging in-
vestment.  See Jeff Devlin & Paul Hemsley, Development Demands Equal Treatment, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 1998, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File.
90. See TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 27, at 53-57; Eleanor M. Fox,
Trade, Competition, and Intellectual Property – TRIPS and Its Antitrust Counterparts, 29 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 481, 486-91 (1996).
91. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 40(2).
92. See A.E. Rodriguez & Malcolm B. Coate, Limits to Antitrust Policy for Reforming
Economies, 18 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 311, 316-38 (1996).
93. See Fox, supra note 68, at 485.
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“misused” the intellectual property right even if no formal violation
of competition law otherwise exists.94  Such a judicial or administra-
tive finding may, in turn, trigger a variety of remedies, including
compulsory licenses95 and even forfeiture of an exclusive right; how-
ever, international law increasingly regulates the state’s ability to re-
sort to these remedies in practice.96
Competition law generally remains within the residual territorial
jurisdiction of the WTO member states,97 and a review of state prac-
tice in the developed countries reveals no consensus concerning ap-
plications of the “abuse” doctrine to specific cases.  For example,
Professor Eleanor Fox found that, in core cases concerning alleged
misuse of patents due to monopoly pricing, refusals to deal, and con-
tracts limiting parallel imports, U.S. and European courts might
reach opposite conclusions on the same set of facts under their re-
spective competition laws.98  One expects the tensions likely to arise
from this lack of consensus to be intensified by the divergent eco-
nomic goals and strategies that developed and developing countries
prefer to adopt.99  The latter are particularly prone to sacrifice effi-
ciency to perceptions of “fairness” and the needs of infant industries
in ways that the former would not recognize as appropriate applica-
tions of sound competition law and policy.100
The TRIPS Agreement reflects this lack of consensus by ex-
pressly allowing states to regulate abuses of intellectual property
rights as they deem fit, subject to certain duties of cooperation101 and
94. See Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licenses: The Rationales and the
Reality, 33 IDEA 349, 349-50 (1992).
95. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31; Abbott, supra note 21, at 387 (“Rules
with respect to the granting of compulsory licenses leave substantial discretion in the hands of
national authorities.  The United States . . . would have preferred tighter limits on the granting
of compulsory licenses.  The compulsory licensing provisions at least in part represent a conces-
sion to developing country interests.”).
96. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 31, 40(1), (2); Reichman, Universal Mini-
mum Standards, supra note 2, at 66-69.
97. See Abbott, supra note 21, at 387.
98. See Fox, supra note 68, at 487.
99. See id. at 490.  Cf. Frank J. Garcia, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the
North American Free Trade Agreement: A Successful Case of Regional Trade Regulation, 8 AM.
U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 817, 818-19 (1993) (demonstrating that the conflict between the interest
of western industrialized countries to protect technologies and the interest of lesser developed
and newly industrialized countries to obtain technologies leads to pirate industries); Giunta &
Shang, supra note 21, at 327-29.
100. See Margaret Chon, Postmodern Progress: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent
Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 98-104 (1993); Fox, supra note 68, at 490.
101. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 69.
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consultation,102 without endorsing any particular approach to this
subject.103  Licenses and other practices that unreasonably restrain
trade or “adversely affect the international transfer of technology”104
are thus legitimate targets of regulatory action, even though such
regulation potentially conflicts with the exercise of intellectual prop-
erty rights.105  As Professor Reichman has elsewhere demonstrated,
the developing countries thus remain free to pick and choose from
the variety of formulations and approaches that developed countries
use to decide what is a progressive response of business to market
conditions and what is an abuse of market power or simply misuse of
an intellectual property right, and to tailor these concepts to the
needs of their own economic development strategies.106
In this permissive environment, the challenge for developing
countries is not that of justifying their right to apply competition law
to limit abuses of intellectual property rights, but rather that of
avoiding self-defeating applications of such laws that could under-
mine transfers of up-to-date technology and the acquisition of needed
foreign investment.107  By the same token, the challenge for technol-
ogy-exporting firms eager to gain access to developing country mar-
kets is to avoid the pitfalls of overzealous applications of competition
law at both the initial transaction phase and at later stages of their
business relations, when investments have been made and local com-
petitors become more of a threat.108
Given these uncertainties, it seems logical that foreign investors
and the relevant state organs or regulatory bodies should seek to ne-
102. See id. art. 40(3).
103. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1(1); Reichman, From Free Riders to
Fair Followers, supra note 17, at 54-55 & n.165.
104. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
105. See Andreas Heinemann, Antitrust Law of Intellectual Property in the TRIPS Agree-
ment of the World Trade Organization, in FROM GATT TO TRIPS: THE AGREEMENT ON
TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 239, 244-47 (Friedrich-Karl
Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996).
106. See J.H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to a Schol-
arly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 363, 377 (1996) [hereinafter Reichman, Introduction
to a Scholarly Debate]; Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers, supra note 17, at 52-58
(discussing ways in which developing countries may formulate competition and protectionist
policies to their best advantage).
107. See Sherwood, Implications for Developing Countries, supra note 29, at 496; discussion
infra note 143 and accompanying text (examining how weak protection may discourage local
innovation and foreign direct investment).
108. See Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards, supra note 2, at 23, 55-56 (observing
that anti-competitive conditions “tend to suffocate the small and medium-sized firms whose
incremental innovations are often the real engines of domestic economic growth”).
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gotiate the competition law aspects of projected activities on a case-
by-case basis.  While the social costs of applying broad-gauged com-
petition law principles in the abstract are everywhere hard to pre-
dict,109 the relative costs and benefits of single transactions are much
easier to pin down and much more likely to produce immediate and
tangible benefits to the host countries.  Because both the competent
state organs and concerned private interests in the host countries
must evaluate the costs and benefits of major technology transfers
and other intellectual property transactions anyway, the extra trans-
action costs of involving public agencies responsible for competition
law in the negotiations would not be high.
At the same time, the host country’s willingness to grant both
market access and immunity from the constraints of its competition
law gives it more clout110 with which to obtain pro-competitive li-
censing terms and other concessions that are tailored to the facts at
hand and not to some ideal transaction or model that happened to
underlie top-down legal rules.111  Conversely, would-be foreign inves-
tors should value the opportunity to leave the public-private bar-
gaining table with contractually secured guarantees against predatory
attacks in the name of competition law that could otherwise consti-
tute a serious risk of loss once the project in question began to suc-
ceed.
While we have so far focused attention on the uncertain inter-
face between competition law and intellectual property law within
the confines of the TRIPS Agreement, one should note that the field
for regulatory interference with intellectual property rights is much
broader than what one envisions through the lens of competition law
alone.  With regard to pharmaceuticals, for example, states may le-
gitimately regulate products within their health, safety and welfare
powers,112 and both price controls and environmental considerations113
109. See Fox, supra note 68, at 497-500 (suggesting that the social costs may be quite high).
110. See IP Way to Help Nations Achieve Developed Status, NEW STRAITS TIMES  (Malay.),
Apr. 13, 1998, at 5, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File (quoting Thailand’s Minis-
try of Commerce Assistant Director General, Mr. Weerawit Weeranawit, as stating, “[i]f we
want to become a developed country then we must have the attitude of the developed countries
and use what they used to reach that goal.”).
111. See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 11, at 323 (noting the shortcomings of the WTO
rule of law model).  Cf. generally Bello, supra note 22.
112. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 8(1).
113. See, e.g., Klaus Bosselmann, Focus: Plants and Politics: The International Legal Re-
gime Concerning Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 111,
128-32 (1996) (arguing that intellectual property rules have undermined biodiversity and con-
tinue to harm the environment); Sara Dillon, Trade and The Environment: A Challenge to the
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remain potential threats to the exercise of intellectual property rights
by foreign firms.  Taxes constitute still another threat,114 as is the po-
tential imposition of compulsory licenses on a variety of public inter-
est grounds, which remain legal under the TRIPS Agreement if cer-
tain conditions are respected.115
Indeed, it seems safe to predict that, as the substantive norms of
the TRIPS Agreement increasingly pinch firms in developing coun-
tries that were accustomed to operating under less constrained condi-
tions, we shall witness the rise of a cottage industry of regulations
whose principle effect is to clog the wheels of the TRIPS Agreement
and slow its application down.116  Such a development would be con-
sistent with past experience under the GATT.  To see why, consider
that the harmonization of intellectual property rights under the
TRIPS Agreement, which reduces impediments to the free flow of
knowledge goods throughout the global marketplace, bears a family
resemblance to the progressive reduction of quotas and tariffs that
previously distorted the market for tangible goods.  The rise of non-
TRIPS-related regulations that we foresee would then parallel the
proliferation of non-tariff barriers that occurred after the early
rounds of multilateral trade negotiations that were held under the
auspices of GATT.117
If this prediction proves accurate, decades will pass before states
become willing to weaken the broad regulatory powers they retain
under Article XX (d) of GATT 1994, in the interests of a more effi-
cient global market for knowledge goods.  In this uncharted regula-
tory climate, meanwhile, there is fertile ground for public-private ini-
tiatives that cut through the red tape and produce positive benefits to
both would-be foreign investors and their host countries.
GATT/WTO Principle of “Ever-Freer Trade,” 11 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 351, 376-82 (1996)
(arguing that the WTO may undermine environmental concerns); ERNST-ULRICH PE-
TERSMANN, INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AFTER
THE URUGUAY ROUND 40-52, 99-117 (1995) (discussing the problems of trade and environ-
ment in the context of the WTO).
114. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 3; Abbott, supra note 21, at 401 (“In applying
IPRs-based taxes to OECD-based enterprises, developing countries must also apply IPRs-
based taxes to their own enterprises.  In theory, this might discourage innovation by domestic
enterprises.”); see also Oddi, supra note 64, at 461-63 (targeted fees).
115. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31.
116. See generally Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 11.
117. Cf. JACKSON, supra note 45, at 154-55 (discussing non-tariff trade barriers and noting
that in 1973 GATT had catalogued over 800 barriers); JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING
THE GATT SYSTEM 15-17 (1990) [hereinafter JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT] (describing
the impact of non-tariff trade barriers and non-tariff measures to address them).
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3. Enforcement Procedures—The Achilles’ Heel of the TRIPS
Agreement.  After the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement in 1994, the
early commentators heralded the inclusion of international minimum
standards governing procedures for enforcing intellectual property
rights in all WTO member states—set out in Articles 41 to 61 of that
Agreement—as one of its greatest achievements.118 Rightly or
wrongly, the lack of any similar standards in the Paris and Berne
Conventions was often blamed for contributing to the weakness of
the international intellectual property system, and the closing of this
gap was deemed indispensable to the creation of an efficient global
market for the free circulation of knowledge goods.119 Later
commentators have, however, begun a more realistic assessment of
these enforcement procedures, which on closer inspection appear to
constitute a set of truly minimum standards of due process on which
future legislation will have to build.120
Article 41 of the TRIPS Agreement expresses the four cardinal
premises of the enforcement provisions, which are largely modeled
on U.S. law.121  First, specified procedures must be made available
under the domestic laws to “permit effective action” against present
and future acts of infringement.  Second, pertinent judicial and ad-
ministrative procedures must be “fair and equitable” and not
“unnecessarily complicated,” or likely to cause “unwarranted de-
lays.”  Third, courts and administrators must base decisions on evi-
dence available to all the parties, and should normally deliver writ-
ten, reasoned opinions.  Fourth, there must be some form of
appellate review for decisions handed down by administrative or ju-
dicial agencies of first instance.
These general provisions, as amplified in the detailed provisions
118. See Wood, supra note 87, at 302; Otten & Wager, supra note 11, at 403-07.
119. See Geller, supra note 17, at 100.
120. See Thomas Dreier, TRIPS and the Enforcement of the Intellectual Property Rights, in
FROM GATT TO TRIPS: THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 248, 276-77 (Friedrich-Kael Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996).
Though stated, minimum standards lack enforcement measures.  “[N]either the DSU, nor the
TRIPS Agreement, nor the Berne or Paris Conventions, provide guidance on how minimum
standards – rather than actual or optimal standards – will work in conjunction with an adjudica-
tory dispute resolution system that is backed with enforcement procedures.”  Dreyfuss &
Lowenfeld, supra note 11, at 281.
121. Compare TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 41 (requiring written notice to defen-
dants) with FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (requiring the same); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 44
(providing the grant of an injunction), with United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 502
(West Supp. 1976) (authorizing courts to grant an injunction); and TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 1, art. 45(2) (allowing an award of attorney’s fees) with 17 U.S.C.A § 505.
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of Articles 42 to 50, are then supplemented by the special require-
ments of Articles 51 to 59, which oblige states to implement border
controls to impede imports of infringing goods, and by the duty to
enact criminal procedures as specified in Article 61.  A failure to
comply with any of these procedural standards of due process could,
in principle, trigger the recalcitrant states’ international responsibility
and subject them to the dispute-settlement machinery of the WTO
Agreement.122
The inherent weakness of this enforcement framework results
from a combination of factors that have recently attracted greater at-
tention.  To begin with, the enforcement provisions are crafted as
broad legal standards, rather than as narrow rules, and their inherent
ambiguity will make it harder for mediators or dispute-settlement
panels to pin down clear-cut violations of international law.123
Moreover, the common-law philosophy that pervades the U.S. legal
system differs greatly from the legal philosophies of other coun-
tries,124 and the TRIPS Agreement expressly mandates respect for
these “differences in national legal systems.”125  These differences,
coupled with the ambiguities of the procedural standards as drafted,
invite decision-makers to take local circumstances into account when
seeking to evaluate actual or potential conflicts between states.126
Deference to local circumstances could also play a critical role
with regard to the scope of protection issues that the TRIPS Agree-
ment usually relegates to local law.  In close cases, countries may
claim that the weak level of enforcement meted out to a particular
subject matter stems from doubts about the requisite scope of protec-
tion required under the substantive standards, and not from culpable
122. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 64(1).
123. See generally Dreier, supra note 120, at 260-64.
124. See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 11, at 292.  But see Reich, supra note 19
(arguing that the Appellate Body will be able to ensure a uniform and consistent development
of jurisprudence).
125. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl. at 83.
126. See Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for Developing Countries Under the TRIPS Agreement,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 735, 770-71 (1996) (stressing conflict of values with developing
countries); J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures, supra note 21, at 344; Lau-
rence R. Helfer, Adjudicating the Copyright Claims Under the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for
a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 357, 411-25 (1998) (suggesting that
TRIPS jurists should explicitly take into consideration local circumstances); see also DSU, su-
pra note 5, art. 8.10 (requiring that if a controversy involves a developing state, one member of
the dispute settlement panel must be chosen from a developing state), 21(7) (requiring that the
panel take into consideration the impact a decision will have on a developing countries econ-
omy when making recommendations).
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laxity in applying the enforcement procedures as such.127  These ar-
guments will prove particularly difficult to overcome in cases con-
cerning electronic information tools, where the TRIPS standards
leave much to the discretion of local laws, and where state practice
with respect to controversial issues varies widely.128
Above all, Article 41(5) contains explicit safeguards that immu-
nize WTO member countries from any “obligation to put in place a
judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights dis-
tinct from that for the enforcement of laws in general” or even to dis-
tribute proportionately greater resources to the enforcement of in-
tellectual property rights than would be available for law
enforcement in general.  In other words, foreign rightsholders are
merely entitled to the same legal product as their national counter-
parts.  Because the rule of law is notoriously weak in most developing
countries, and the systemic capabilities of enforcing intellectual
property rights remain especially rudimentary in many of these coun-
tries, foreign rightsholders could experience serious disappointments
when they rely on the TRIPS enforcement procedures in actual prac-
tice.129
Logically, of course, rightsholders should consider earmarking a
share of their expected royalties from the technology-importing
countries to supplement the resources available to law enforcement
authorities in those countries.130  Local authorities may also benefit
from the technical assistance to which developing countries are enti-
tled under the TRIPS Agreement.131  However, rightsholders will not
willingly contribute to the costs of law enforcement without some
guarantees concerning the quality of the legal product likely to be
127. See generally Betten, supra note 58; Hackett, supra note 58.
128. See generally Reichman, Know-How Gap in TRIPS, supra note 48; Reichman & Sam-
uelson, supra note 61; see also, e.g., W. Matthew Wyman, Comment, International Database
Protection: A Multilateral Treaty Solution to the United States’ Database Dilemma, 37 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 427, 438-49 (1997) (describing some of the differences between American and
European approach to protection of electronic databases).
129. For example, a 1998 report prepared by the economic section of the United States
Embassy in Thailand stated that despite legislative and judicial reforms, Thailand still fell short
in the protection of intellectual property.  See U.S. State Department, 1997 Country Reports on
Economic Policy and Trade Practices, Thailand: Economic Policy and Trade Practices Report
(Jan. 1998) at <http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/trade_reports/eastasia97/thailand97
>.  The report noted, in particular, problems arising from corruption and nepotism.  See id.;
Corben, supra note 38; Harish Mehta, Thailand Still Plagued By Graft, Nepotism: US Govt Re-
port Lashes Out at Ineffective Measures Against Intellectual Piracy, BUS. TIMES (Sing.), June 24,
1998, at 7, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File.
130. See Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures, supra note 21, at 355.
131. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 67.
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delivered and its relevance to their needs. By the same token, nothing
obliges WTO member states to accept foreign funds proffered for the
purpose of strengthening local enforcement procedures, at least so
long as the sovereign exercise of their police powers is not so lacking
in good faith as to engage the state’s responsibility for nonviolatory
acts of nullification and impairment under Article 64 of the TRIPS
Agreement.132
In theory, disgruntled rightsholders might persuade their own
governments to invoke the WTO’s dispute-settlement machinery,
with a view to punishing states whose enforcement efforts fail to sat-
isfy the new international minimum standards.133  But we remain pro-
foundly skeptical about the efficacy of this tactic.  Past experience
shows that international tribunals have been notoriously reluctant to
find actionable violations of those minimum standards of due process
that states already recognize as binding legal obligations under public
international law.134 This deference to local administration of justice
in the name of state sovereignty seems likely to continue under the
TRIPS Agreement.135
Even if some dispute-settlement panels were inclined to take a
more activist stance with regard to the enforcement of intellectual
property rights, it will remain objectively hard to distinguish non-
compliance due to foot-dragging from shortcomings attributable to
the rudimentary state of law enforcement that prevails in most devel-
oping countries.136  For this and other reasons, Professor Reichman
has elsewhere suggested that, absent a clear violation of the national
treatment clause, WTO dispute-settlement panels evaluating claims
of inadequate enforcement should only intervene when there is a
consistent pattern of gross violations of the relevant international
minimum standards.137
A dispute-settlement panel might reasonably exercise less re-
straint if it had grounds to question the accused state’s good faith
132. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 64; Reichman, Universal Minimum Stan-
dards, supra note 2, at 87 (noting that TRIPS art. 64(2) puts a moratorium on complaints about
nonviolatory acts of nullification or impairment arising under the TRIPS Agreement for a pe-
riod of five years).
133. See generally Bello, supra note 22.
134. See Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures, supra note 21, at 348 nn. 59-60
and accompanying text.
135. See generally Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard
of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 193 (1996).
136. See discussion supra notes 38, 129 (discussing Thailand).
137. See Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures, supra note 21, at 347.
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compliance with the border control measures of the TRIPS Agree-
ment, as distinct from its application of the general standards of en-
forcement.  As Professors Lowenfeld and Dreyfuss have pointed out,
deference to local decision-making is less warranted when the con-
duct in question adversely affects the global market for knowledge
goods, and not just the accused state’s own internal market, and lax
enforcement of border control measures falls under this rubric.138
Even so, one should note that the TRIPS Agreement does not ex-
pressly oblige member states to prevent exports of infringing goods,139
which adds to the enforcement costs and burdens of states to which
“counterfeit trademarked and pirated copyright goods” are shipped.
In the past, moreover, states were most reluctant to allow other
states to question the workings of their domestic customs authorities,
and it remains to be seen whether governments in leading developed
countries will be more forthcoming when they implement the TRIPS
Agreement.140  Unless the European powers take steps to impede im-
ports of counterfeit goods into such notorious receptacles as the ports
of Naples141 and Rotterdam,142 for example, despite the economic dis-
ruption this will cause, they should not expect much sympathy from
the international community when they seek to impede similar activi-
ties in the developing countries.
For all the reasons discussed above, we predict that the level of
enforcement under the TRIPS Agreement will greatly disappoint
rightsholders in the developed countries, and that recourse to coer-
138. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 51-60; Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note
11, at 327.
139. See Jasna Arsic, Combating Trade in Counterfeit Goods: The GATT and the EC Ap-
proaches, 18 WORLD COMP.  L. & ECON. REV. 75, 84 (1995) (“Countries producing and ex-
porting counterfeit and pirated goods have no obligation under the Agreement to inspect ex-
ported goods, which places the burden of finding counterfeit and pirated goods on the countries
of importation.”).
140. See Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures, supra note 21, at 340.
141. Between 1995 and 1998, the illegal taping and reselling of videos, compact discs, and
computer software in Italy cost United States industry an estimated $2 billion.  See James Blitz,
Italian Piracy Bill May Aid US, FIN. TIMES, June 10, 1998, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Majpap File (noting that in Naples, high capacity black market compact disc replicators
are commonplace).
142. Pirated tapes account for 45% of the market in Netherlands.  See Export Briefs, J.
COMM., May 12, 1987 at 6A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File.  The Netherlands
has also become a major trans-shipping point for counterfeit goods.  See Nancy Dunne, U.S.
Record Industry Seeks Help on Pirates, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1983, at 8, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Majpap File; see also Spore Stands Out with Low Software Piracy Rate, THE
STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), July 26, 1994, at 40, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File
(noting that the Netherlands has a relatively high piracy rate).
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cive measures will not appreciably improve the situation in the short
and medium terms.  This is not an unmitigated blessing for the devel-
oping countries, however, because shortcomings in the worldwide en-
forcement machinery can sometimes discourage both local innova-
tion and much-needed foreign investment.143  Monitoring the
tradeoffs (including lost opportunity costs), will not be an easy task
especially if some or many foreign investors simply vote because of
dissatisfaction with the way intellectual property rights are enforced
at the local level.
When, instead, potential investors make their enforcement needs
known, and the specific projects in question are of reciprocal interest
to firms and governments in the technology-importing countries, the
logical response to this uncertainty is for the parties to negotiate a
guaranteed level of intellectual property enforcement commensurate
with other aspects of the deal.144  A proper forum for public-private
initiatives could facilitate these case-by-case transactions and help to
ensure that they did not compromise the state’s overall policy pos-
ture.  Within such a framework, the very uncertainties inherent in the
TRIPS enforcement standards become an incentive for would-be pri-
vate investors to obtain tangible guarantees concerning the enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights, in exchange for palpable contri-
butions to local economic development and social welfare.
143. See Janet T. MacLaughlin et al., The Economic Significance of Piracy, in INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 89, 101 (R. Michael
Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988) (suggesting that protection of intellectual property
serves as an economic incentive for innovative activity); Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual
Property Systems and Investment Stimulation: The Rating of Systems in Eighteen Developing
Countries, 37 IDEA 261 (1997) [hereinafter Sherwood, Intellectual Property Systems and In-
vestment Stimulation] (finding that in evaluating intellectual property protection in various de-
veloping countries including Barbados, Mexico and South Korea, one of the key factors in de-
termining a country’s desirability as a place for foreign investment is its enforcement
mechanisms); Josh Martin, Copyright Law Reforms Mean Better Business Climate, J. COMM,
Mar. 7, 1996, at 1C, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File (illustrating that as Arab
nations have started to provide stronger intellectual property protection, foreign firms have
been more willing to invest in them).  A survey from the International Finance Corp., an affili-
ate of the World Bank, found that IPR legislation was a key factor in whether United States
companies were willing to do business in a foreign country.  While 48% of the companies sur-
veyed said that IPR laws had a strong influence in whether to establish manufacturing facilities
abroad, 80% said that IPRs were an important factor in determining whether to establish re-
search and development facilities abroad.  The survey was reported in Martin, supra.
144. See Paul Edward Geller, From Patchwork to Network: Strategies for International In-
tellectual Property in Flux, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 553, 567, 570-73 (1998) (suggesting that
public-private initiatives would be useful in overcoming the differences between national laws
concerning networks).
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4. Uncertain Effects of the Safeguard Provisions.  We have been
emphasizing the opportunities for strategic maneuvering that states
retain under the TRIPS Agreement, despite the coercive instruments
the WTO Agreement makes available to prevent nullification and
impairment of the benefits supposed to flow from the Uruguay
Round.  Now, instead, we consider the case of a state that tries to
implement its TRIPS obligations with demonstrable good faith but
encounters economic hardships and difficulties that might arguably
justify some measure of relief.  The question is whether that state can
successfully defend self-help measures taken in the name of some
“vital” economic interest against claims of nullification and
impairment of benefits under the TRIPS Agreement.
Formally, a state’s options in this regard are severely limited by
the “package deal” concept underlying the WTO Agreement itself,145
which requires member states to adopt the entire set of multilateral
agreements incorporated into Annexes I, II and III.146  In other
words, the benefits of increased market access resulting from the
WTO Agreement are conditioned upon acceptance of a duty to com-
ply with all its corresponding obligations to lower tariffs and remove
nontariff barriers that distort international trade.147  No group of
countries is singled out for “differential and more favorable treat-
ment,” a usual practice under the GATT that acquired the force of
law in the Tokyo Round.148  To the extent that developing countries
and so-called “countries in transition” (away from centrally planned
economies) still retain privileges and immunities that take account of
their special circumstances, these exceptions are separately identified
in each of the Annexes to the WTO Agreement and expressly limited
to their particular context.149
With specific regard to the level of intellectual property protec-
tion under the TRIPS Agreement, all Member States are held to the
same international minimum standards of protection and enforce-
145. See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 126, at 377; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism
and International Organizations, 17 J. INT’L L. BUS. 398, 442 (1997).
146. See WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2(2); Final Act, supra note 1, para. 4.
147. See JACKSON,  supra note 45, at 47-59.
148. See Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT, BISD, 265/203 (1980).  See generally Abdulgawi
A. Yusuf, The GATT Enabling Clause, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L., 488 (1980).
149. See, e.g., DSU, supra note 5, art. 12 (11); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 6, 7,
65, 66.
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ment,150 and there is no “two-tiered” regime allowing for “differential
and more favorable treatment.”151  Instead, a complicated set of tran-
sitional arrangements allows both developing countries and countries
in transition a five-year grace period in which to fulfill their obliga-
tions,152 subject to a number of technical adjustments that may further
delay full compliance with the patent provisions for another five
years.153  Least-developed countries (LDCs), which are not defined in
the TRIPS Agreement, obtain a ten-year period of immunity from
the duty to implement its substantive or procedural standards.154
Nevertheless, even LDCs—like the developing countries and coun-
tries in transition—must immediately give effect to the national
treatment and MFN clauses of Articles 3 and 4.155
On closer inspection, however, it appears that vestiges of the old
“two-tiered” regime have been incorporated into the TRIPS Agree-
ment, in a kind of “invisible ink” that will become more legible over
time.156  Thus, Article 66(1) recognizes the “special needs and re-
quirements of least-developed country members . . . and their need
for flexibility to create a viable technological base.”  It then specifi-
cally endows the Council for TRIPS with the power to “accord exten-
sions” of the initial ten-year grace period, when acting upon a “duly
motivated request by a least-developed country member.”  This same
theme is reiterated in Article XI(2) of the WTO Agreement, which
flatly declares that the “least-developed countries recognized as such
by the United Nations will only be required to undertake commit-
ments and concessions to the extent consistent with their individual
development, financial and trade needs, or their administrative and
institutional capabilities.”
As Professor Reichman has elsewhere explained, some form of
two-tiered regime was mandated by pre-existing international law,
and despite the huffing and puffing of certain trade delegations, its de
facto recognition in the TRIPS framework was unavoidable.157  By the
same token, LDCs invoking these privileges cannot allow themselves
to become havens for wholesale piracy of the intellectual property
150. Id. art. 1.
151. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
152. See id. art 65.
153. See id. art. 70(8), (9).
154. Id. art. 66.
155. Id. art. 66(1).  See generally, Otten & Wager, supra note 11, at 408-09.
156. See Reichman, Introduction to a Scholarly Debate, supra note 106, at 373.
157. See id.
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rights covered by the TRIPS Agreement without exposing them-
selves, after a five-year moratorium, to claims of nonviolatory acts of
nullification and impairment that could succeed on the merits.158  The
intriguing question is whether the TRIPS Agreement does not also
contain the ingredients for concocting yet a third tier of exceptions
and immunities, not restricted to LDCs, if and when developing
countries or countries in transition should encounter undue economic
hardships despite their good faith efforts to meet their treaty obliga-
tions.
While the relevant arguments of any given developing country to
this effect must necessarily vary with the circumstances, and would
also depend on the nature of the complaints lodged against it, in most
cases these countries would logically fall back upon the broad objec-
tives and principles set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment.159  Article 7 insists that “the protection and enforcement of in-
tellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of tech-
nological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and eco-
nomic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”160  Article
8(1) expands on this theme by allowing member states “to promote
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development,” provided that such meas-
ures “are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”  These
objectives are also echoed in the preamble to the TRIPS Agreement,
which stresses the “underlying public policy objectives” of national
intellectual property systems, “including developmental and techno-
logical objectives”;161 and again in the preamble to the WTO Agree-
ment itself, which recognizes a “need for positive efforts designed to
ensure that developing countries . . . secure a share in the growth in
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
158.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 64(1) (incorporating by reference GATT
1994, supra note 12, arts. XXII, XXIII, and DSU, supra note 5, art. 64(2)) (suspending sub-
paragraphs 1(6) and 1(c) of GATT 1994, supra note 12, art. XXIII concerning nonviolatory acts
of nullification and impairment for a period of five years); U.S. v. India, supra note 18 (applying
this provision to reverse panel opinion in first TRIPS dispute arising under DSU).  See gener-
ally, Reichman, Securing Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement After U.S. v. India, supra note
18, at 595-97.
159. See generally Yusuf, supra note 1, at 10-15; see also Giunta & Shang, supra note 21.
160. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 7.
161. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at 84.
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development.”162
Whether objective evidence of hardship stemming from good-
faith compliance with the TRIPS standards could trigger these safe-
guards would depend on numerous hard-to-predict factors.  In gen-
eral, the member state seeking relief would contend that supervening
events or changed conditions had frustrated the attainment of the
goals and purposes of the TRIPS Agreement, as specified in Articles
7 and 8(1), and that, in its case, these Articles had failed in their es-
sential purpose.  It would claim that its own benefits under the WTO
Agreement could be nullified or impaired under the facts at hand,
unless it obtained appropriate relief.
To this same end, any adversely affected developing country
could invoke Article 23 of the Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),163 which explic-
itly recognizes an affirmative defense or counterclaim for “redress
of . . . an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the cov-
ered agreements.”164  A developing country might add that any failure
of the basic objectives set out in Articles 7 and 8(1) of the TRIPS
Agreement should automatically reinstate that country’s entitlement
to differential and more favorable treatment under pre-existing
GATT law, as amended in 1980.165
Predicting the outcome of such litigation would be risky at best,
and contingent on many imponderables, including the forum in which
recourse to these safeguards happened to occur.  If, for example, a
developing country raised these issues before the Council for TRIPS,
it could appeal to the mediatory powers thought to be inherent in the
Council’s duty “to monitor the operation of this Agreement . . .
and . . . afford members the opportunity of consulting on matters re-
lating to the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.”166
However, the developed countries could counter that Article 66 of
the TRIPS Agreement empowers the Council to extend waivers for
hardship only to LDCs, and that it, therefore, lacks any similar power
to extend waivers to countries outside that category.
This debate might trigger an interpretive decision concerning the
powers of the Council for TRIPS, which requires a three-fourths
majority of the member states acting through the Ministerial Confer-
162. WTO Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl.
163. See DSU, supra note 5.
164. Id. art. 23(a).
165. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
166. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 68.
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ence or the General Council of the WTO under Article XI of the
WTO Agreement.  Alternatively, and by analogous means, it might
produce a “waiver of an obligation” due to “exceptional circum-
stances” by the Ministerial Conference also acting under Article IX
of the same Agreement.  In this connection, one should observe that
Article IX (2)(b) expressly authorizes the Council for TRIPS to rec-
ommend waivers to obligations arising under the TRIPS Agreement,
and indeed, such a recommendation is made a pre-requisite for ap-
proval by the Ministerial Conference.
Meanwhile, as Professors Lowenfeld and Dreyfuss have pointed
out, an aggrieved developed country might take matters into its own
hands by convoking a dispute-settlement panel to hear its claim of
nullification or impairment, despite the attempts of the defendant
state to obtain a waiver for hardship or other special consideration
from the Council for TRIPS.167  In such cases, the Council for TRIPS
is given no express powers to stay the appointment of a dispute-
settlement panel or the relevant proceedings.168  Unless a duly ap-
pointed panel deferred to a requested stay by one of the parties or by
the Council for TRIPS in response either to the Council’s inferred
powers or to an interpretive decision of the WTO Ministerial Coun-
cil, that panel might have to decide on the merits of the developing
country’s appeal for relief due to hardship under the safeguard provi-
sions of the TRIPS Agreement and the WTO Agreement.169
Here, in turn, the end result could depend on the legal philoso-
phy of the members of the panel itself.  For example, panelists com-
mitted to a strong “rule of law” philosophy would be more likely to
resist attributing legal effect to the safeguard provisions.  Those ad-
hering to the traditional view of the GATT as a forum for continuing
and evolving trade negotiations, might be more inclined to temper
the formal obligations of any given state in light of empirical reali-
ties.170
167. See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 11, at 315.
168. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 68.
169. See DSU, supra note 5, art. 3.2  (providing that dispute settlement panels “preserve
the rights and obligations of the Members” under the TRIPS Agreement), art. 11 (requiring
that dispute settlement panels  make “an objective assessment” of the matter before them).
Query whether a dispute settlement panel in this situation might itself decide to stay the pro-
ceedings pending a formal and timely request for a waiver under WTO Agreement, supra note
1, art. IX.
170. See discussion supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the disparate views on
the pros and cons of a rule of law approach to dispute resolution).  The “rule of law” model and
the traditional model competed against each other in the old GATT dispute settlement regime
as well.  See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the
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We do not pretend to know how these issues will ultimately be
resolved.  But we do think that the very uncertainties that are built
into the safeguard clauses of the TRIPS Agreement constitute an ad-
ditional incentive for public-private initiatives to reach bargained-for,
transactional solutions on a case-by-case basis.  Opportunities to ne-
gotiate fast-track implementation of specific intellectual property
standards by selected LDCs in exchange for accelerated transfers of
technology or commitments to invest seem especially appropriate in
this context.  Even with regard to the developing countries, as distinct
from LDCs, the safeguards identified in Articles 7 and 8(1) would
seem to admonish against pushing them too hard and too fast, lest
they push back in the manner outlined above.171  By the same token,
case-by-case transactions that seek to accommodate instances of
hardship by exchanging other advantages in areas where no such
hardship exists, could—if consistent with the MFN principle—
expedite attainment of the goals underlying the TRIPS Agreement
better than  might otherwise be achieved by coercive measures,172 and
with much less strain on the comity between states.173
B. The Pessimist’s View: Delayed Expectations
We are not suggesting that the TRIPS Agreement altogether
lacks teeth, even though its normative ambiguities, regulatory gaps,
procedural infirmities, and built-in safety valves allow noncoopera-
tive states abundant opportunities to dilute its impact.  As stated at
the outset, the TRIPS Agreement will primarily serve to eliminate
wholesale duplication of high tech goods, especially information
goods, emanating from the developed countries.174  It will also bring
NICs gradually into line with international intellectual property
norms that have stood the test of time,175 and it will eventually help to
New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 477, 479 (1994) (“Over the forty years of GATT dispute set-
tlement there has been an ebb and flow between . . . the models.”).
171. See Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures, supra note 21, at 356 & n.12;
Abbott, supra note 21, at 399 (predicting that developing countries will “continue to resist
changes to their IPRs laws, and when they do make changes, they will be slow to enforce them
in favor of foreign enterprises.”).
172. See generally Alford, supra note 32; de Koning, supra note 47.
173. See Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures, supra note 21, at 350-51.
174. See discussion supra note 38 and accompanying text (providing statistical evidence that
piracy is down).
175. See Hanns Ullrich, GATT: Industrial Property Protection, Fair Trade and Develop-
ment, in GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE INTELLECTUAL PROTECTION OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY  147–52 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1988).
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stimulate local innovation in the developing countries.176  While these
are important contributions, it seems fair to observe that they might
have been accomplished by simpler and less socially costly means
than the elaborate legislative framework of the TRIPS Agreement.177
If that framework nonetheless represents an historic achieve-
ment, it is because it lays the groundwork for long-term harmoniza-
tion of intellectual property rights on a non-territorial foundation,
which is indispensable for the future growth of the worldwide econ-
omy.178  The questions we are raising bear, instead, on the short- and
medium-term perspectives, in which most countries of the world will
still be struggling to realize the promise of economic prosperity in-
herent in the relative (and now spotty) success of the NICs.  As Hil-
ton Root’s study makes clear, knowing that free-market reforms can
work and making them work in one’s own social and economic cir-
cumstances are two different things.179  While the NICs’ challenge to
the economic and technical supremacy of Europe and the United
States could not go without appropriate legal responses, it would be
quite mistaken to treat other developing countries as if they were on
an equal footing with the “tigers” before they had, in fact, succeeded
in making market reforms work for them.180
In short, states with different economic and social needs, whose
primary goal is to overcome technological lag, will not meekly coop-
erate in a worldwide scheme to curb the power of the NICs if it
176. See discussion supra note 143 and accompanying text (demonstrating how stronger
intellectual property protection can improve local innovation and stimulate foreign direct in-
vestment).
177. Professor Reichman would have preferred a softer, more gradual approach, built
around a universal norm against slavish copying, which could have been integrated into Article
10bis of the Paris Convention, supra note 2, and made applicable to all WTO countries.  In con-
trast, some observers would have preferred an even harder line than was ultimately taken by
the TRIPS Agreement.  See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 99, at 820-21 (arguing that section 301 of
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 is one of the more effective tools in com-
bating weak intellectual property protection); Giunta & Shang, supra note 21, at 339-40
(“Bilateral agreements provide the most workable vehicle for addressing the contentious issues
surrounding intellectual property protection.  Unlike multilateral agreements, bilateral agree-
ments are country specific and thus may provide more protection for owners of foreign patent
rights.”).
178. See JACKSON, supra note 45, at 310-13.
179. See ROOT, supra note 23.
180. See Simon Lester, The Asian Newly Industrialized Countries to Graduate From
Europe’s GSP Tariffs, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 220 (1995) (observing that the poorest countries are
being forced to compete on even terms with countries with much higher gross national products
(GNP), especially the NICs).
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means that they cannot become NICs in their own right.181  The de-
veloping countries will not content themselves with continued tech-
nological dependence on the existing economic powers merely be-
cause the TRIPS Agreement can be read to that effect.182  Rather,
these countries will adopt every available means to follow in the foot-
steps of the NICs; and in so doing, they will take advantage of all the
weaknesses inherent in the TRIPS regime that we have identified.183
In effect, each country will thus strive to reconcile implementation of
the TRIPS Agreement with its own development needs.184  The level
of truly effective intellectual property protection around the world
will gradually rise in relation to the broader social benefits it brings
to these countries and to the growing perception that this type of pro-
tection actually serves the interest of national systems of innovation
everywhere.185
In the meanwhile, tensions between high and low-protectionist
countries will abound, and managing the attendant risks will require
more statesmanship than international institutions are accustomed to
mustering.  On the positive side, each developing country must still
strike its own territorial balance between incentives to create and the
discipline of free competition.186  The resulting efforts will benefit us-
ers, second-comers, and fair followers everywhere, including the de-
veloped countries, by maintaining suitable levels of competition in
the global market even as the extraterritorial norms of intellectual
property protection in the TRIPS Agreement promote greater diffu-
sion of knowledge goods.187  On the negative side, these tensions
could deprive intellectual property owners of the full potential re-
turns from their investments, and could also prevent them from real-
181. Cf. Garcia, supra note 99, at 819 (noting that piracy has been an economic policy of
the NICs and the LDCs); Carlos A. Primo Braga, The Newly Industrializing Economies, in
GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
168, 172 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) (observing that among developing nations,
NICs are more likely to recognize the value of intellectual property because industrialization
has meant that the cost of piracy has begun to outweigh the benefits).
182.   See Giunta & Shang, supra note 21, passim; sources cited supra note 31 and accom-
panying text.
183. See discussion supra Parts A, B.
184. See Giunta & Shang, supra note 21, at 343 (“The need for intellectual property protec-
tion, therefore, must be analyzed for each foreign country and for each particular item of pro-
tection.”).
185. See discussion supra note 143.
186. See Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers, supra note 17, at 86-89 (“Balancing
Interests at the Local Level”), 89-93 (“Towards a Transnational, Pro-Competitive Equilib-
rium”).
187. Accord Sherwood, Implications for Developing Countries, supra note 29, at 493-96.
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izing the economies of scale that extraterritorial protection makes
possible.188  As a result, governments in the developed countries may
increasingly resort to the coercive machinery of the WTO Agreement
to vindicate the unfulfilled expectations of the technologically most
innovative firms whose hopes are riding on the TRIPS Agreement.189
Coercion is, however, a delicate, risky, and possibly counterpro-
ductive strategy, one that could easily backfire on those governments
that succumb to this temptation.190  The only sure road to victory be-
fore WTO dispute-settlement panels is to bring cases involving clear
cut violations of the TRIPS standards, which would produce the
“slam dunk” decisions that the former legal counsel to United States
Trade Representative, Judith Bello, wants to see.191  Unless a gov-
ernment limits its use of coercion to such cases, it may fail to per-
suade panel members of the soundness of its complaint, which could
cause embarrassment at home and weaken confidence in the still em-
bryonic WTO.192
But so-called “slam dunk” cases are less productive, and above
all, less identifiable than is commonly supposed.  If, for example, the
case in question involves gross or wholesale free-riding on protected
interests in clear violation of express norms, the very need to litigate
probably reflects a failure of both bilateral and multilateral media-
tory processes.  At the very least, it would demonstrate the need to
bolster the interim powers of the Council for TRIPS, which should be
able to stay needless dispute-settlement proceedings until other, less
conflictual means of persuasion were exhausted.
If, as appears more likely, the case involves what one side per-
ceives as a “slam dunk” violation and the other side regards as an un-
resolved ambiguity in the codified norms themselves, premature re-
sort to dispute-settlement will prove risky indeed.193  Besides losing
188. See id. at 493-510.
189. See Shoyer, supra note 33 (encouraging the United States to take disputes to the
WTO); Smith, supra note 16, at 576-78 (advocating aggressive agenda for copyright owners);
see also Hugh C. Hansen, International Copyright: An Unorthodox Analysis, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 579 (1996) (spirited defense of high-protectionist ethos).  But see Peter A.
Jaszi, Goodbye to All That: A Reluctant [and Perhaps Premature] Adieu to a Constitutionally-
Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 595
(1996); Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613 (1996).
190. See Alford, supra note 32, at 21-23 (observing that such coercion may also undermine
long term international relations); accord de Koning, supra note 47.
191. See Bello, supra note 22,  passim.
192. See id. at 390.
193. See Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures, supra note 21, at 335-354.
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on the merits, an over-confident plaintiff could watch the dispute-
settlement panel fill gaps in international intellectual property law at
the expense of its own domestic sovereignty.194  We do not believe
that the developed countries are in fact ready to surrender their abil-
ity to make intellectual property policy to international bodies,195 and
we doubt that the WTO, in its present formative phase, could long
withstand the tensions likely to result from divisive litigation over in-
tellectual property issues on which no clear consensus had in fact
emerged in relevant state practice.196
In view of these risks, we believe that the TRIPS Agreement can
be made to yield greater benefits for all member countries in the
short and medium terms by developing an alternative institutional
framework for encouraging a more cooperative approach to imple-
menting its normative and procedural standards.  With such a frame-
work in place, we contend that appropriate public-private initiatives
can enable private rightsholders to realize their objectives faster than
might otherwise be possible, while producing corresponding gains to
the cooperating states.197  In the rest of this Article, we, therefore, ex-
plain the nature, role, and field of operations that we envision for
such initiatives and consider the impact they might have on the proc-
ess of implementing the TRIPS Agreement as a whole.
III.  STRUCTURING A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY TO
PRODUCE WIN-WIN RESULTS
In a recent article, Professor Ejan Mackaay reminds us that in-
tellectual property laws are exercises in building fences around intan-
gible assets, and that such fences are inherently imperfect and ap-
proximative.198  Yet, these very imperfections perform important
social roles because they leave room for spillovers and re-uses by
second-comers who build on the advances of those who preceded
them.199  They also stimulate the formation of  private contracts that
adjust gaps in the intellectual property fence to the needs of particu-
194. See Paul Geller, supra note 17, passim; Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Proce-
dures, supra note 21, at 339-40.  But see U.S. v. India, supra note 18 (opting for strict construc-
tionist approach).
195. Cf. Croley & Jackson, supra note 135, at 194, 211 (discussing the tension between na-
tional sovereignty and international institutions).
196. See generally Bello, supra note 22; Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 11.
197. See also Geller, supra note 144.
198. Ejan Mackaay, Legal Hybrids: Beyond Property and Monopoly?, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
2630, 2636-38 (1994).
199. See Cohendet et al., supra note 80.
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lar parties.200  The domestic courts and legislatures constantly perform
a similar function for the public at large by attempting to strike a so-
cially desirable balance between incentives to create and the needs of
a competitive marketplace.201
A chronic problem for policymakers even in the most developed
countries is that the one-size-fits-all paradigms that underlie classical
intellectual property law have proved especially inadequate to deal
with the needs of innovators and borrowers in an information age.202
This problem is compounded many times over in the developing
countries, where different players at different stages of development
demand different and contradictory approaches to intellectual prop-
erty rights in their respective fields of interest.203  When foreign
rightsholders add their demands for a particular level of protection to
this already volatile mixture, it can put policymakers in the crossfire
among irreconcilable interests and paralyze the government’s capac-
ity to resolve these tensions in the national interest.204
Such a paralysis can have deadly effects in the developing coun-
tries, moreover, where the private sector may not be capable of
working around the impasse or of benefiting from the resulting lack
of government intervention, as might occur in more developed coun-
tries.205  According to a recent study by Hilton Root, in contrast,
200. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World,
82 MINN. L. REV. 609, 613 (1998) (observing that contract law could help to adjust the gaps in
the law of cyberspace).
201. See Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Svc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding that a competing
work is free to copy the facts from an original work, but may not copy the original author’s ex-
pression); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 61, at 58-113 (contrasting balanced approach of
copyright laws with unbalanced attempts to enact an exclusive property right in noncopyrigh-
table databases).
202. See generally Charles R. McManis, Taking The TRIPS Agreement On the Information
Superhighway: International Intellectual Property Protection and Emerging Computer Technol-
ogy, 41 VILL. L. REV. 207 (1996); J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copy-
right Paradigm, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2500-19 (1994).
203. See TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 27, at 13-22.
204. See text accompanying notes 68-79; U.S. v. India, supra note 18 (an example of just
such an impasse, which resulted in WTO dispute-settlement against India); see also Kenneth J.
Cooper, India Raises a Stink Over Fragrant Rice, THE WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 1998, at A26,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File (reporting that Indian farmers had marched on
the United States Embassy in New Delhi in protest of what the farmers considered to be “bio-
piracy” because of the patenting of a new strain of rice called basmati); Amy Louise Kazmin,
India to Sign Up to Patents Treaty, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1998, at 4, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Majpap File (reporting that after a ten year debate, and spurred in part by the contro-
versy over a United States company’s patent for a new strain of rice it called basmati, India has
acceded to the Paris Convention); Ritchie et al., supra note 71.
205. Cf. ROOT, supra note 23, at 65-89 (describing the changing needs of Malaysia).
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“good governance” has been an essential component of free-market
reforms in those NICs whose economic successes have so challenged
the developed countries and captured the imagination of other de-
veloping countries.206  In this context, “good governance” usually
means ensuring that the benefits of social sacrifices will be widely
shared by most members of the community and that economic actors
who take entrepreneurial risks will not become the victims of gov-
ernment-sponsored predatory behavior later on.207
Because intellectual property rights are an essential component
of every national innovation system, their introduction to, and ad-
ministration within, the larger context of free-market reforms simi-
larly requires “good governance.”208  As in other cases, this requires
governments to monitor and adjust the intellectual property fences,
with a view to ensuring appropriate rewards not only for those who
invest in innovation and who actually create and invent, but also for
the public at large, which must eventually share in the benefits that
result from the social costs of temporary restraints on trade.209  Good
governance in this context further implies a high degree of trust and
confidence that those who invest and create—whether domestic or
foreign—will not become the victims of predation later on. 210
“Good governance” with respect to the exercise of intellectual
property rights in developing countries would thus logically seem to
warrant a higher degree of mediation than is customary in developed
countries, where private antagonists thrash out their differences be-
fore courts of law, and intellectual property policymaking is often as
much a judicial or administrative function as an exercise in legislative
initiatives. These are, indeed, concrete instances of the process of
adjusting the size of the holes in the intellectual property fence that
206. Cf. id. at 145-177.
207. WILLIAM KINGSTON, INNOVATION, CREATIVITY AND LAW 79 (1990); Wendy J. Gor-
don, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 853, 854-59  (illuminating discussion of conditions for market failure).
208. See generally Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct In-
vestment, and Technology Transfer (International Finance Corporation of the World Bank
Group Discussion Paper 19, 1994), cited in Sherwood, Implications for Developing Countries,
supra note 29.
209. Cf. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 1.03A
(1993) (“Copyright law is predicated upon the dual premises that the public benefits from crea-
tive activities of authors and that the copyright monopoly is a necessary condition to the full
realization of such creative activities.”).
210. See generally Russell E. Levin et al., Ex Parte Patent Practices and the Rights of Third
Parties, 45 AM. U.L. REV. 1987 (1996) (providing examples of the combination of judicial func-
tion and legislative initiative in creating intellectual property policymaking).
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Professor Makaay emphasized in his article.211  Even in the developed
countries, moreover, there is growing interest in mediation and alter-
native dispute resolution as means of obtaining comparable adjust-
ments with lower transaction costs.212  The evidence further suggests
that any advantages to be derived from mediating intellectual prop-
erty disputes by alternatives to litigation are likely to be even greater
when these disputes concern transnational intellectual property is-
sues,213 particularly when firms or governments in developing coun-
tries are interested parties.214
These strands logically come together when we think about pub-
lic-private initiatives to promote cooperative strategies for imple-
menting the TRIPS Agreement.  In other words, the appropriate in-
stitutional framework should provide a means for tailor-making
domestic legal fences so that both foreign rightsholders and local in-
terests can reciprocally benefit from specific transactions.215  In the
process, “good governance” should ensure that the benefits are
widely shared and defended against predation, and that any positive
outcomes are obtained at acceptable social costs, and without undue
social conflict.
211. See Mackaay, supra note 198, at 2637 (“Where valuable innovations are too easily
copied, the fence is not high enough and the owner of information loses revenue to poachers.”).
212. See, e.g., Tomas E. Carbonneau, Rendering Arbitral Awards with Reasons: The Elabo-
ration of a Common Law on International Transactions, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 579
(1985); Deloitte & Touche Litig. Servs., 1993 Survey of General and Outside Counsels: Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution 8-9 (describing advantages of ADR in diverse business fields including
intellectual property), cited in Catherine Cronin-Harris, Symposium on Business Dispute
Resolution: ADR and Beyond: Mainstreaming: Systematizing Corporate Use of ADR, 59 ALB.
L. REV. 847 (1996); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1995); Julia A. Martin, Note: Arbitrating in the Alps Rather than Litigating
in Los Angeles: The Advantages of International Intellectual Property-Specific Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution, 49 STAN. L. REV. 917 (1997); INTA Online (last modified May 18, 1998); see
also HILARY ASTOR & CHRISTINE M. CHINKIN, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AUSTRALIA, ch. 1
(1992) (providing a practical guide to ADR, including a list of advantages from the perspective
of industry insiders).  Professor Chinkin has expressed some reservations about ADR in inter-
national law, which Professor John Jackson also shares (unpublished communications).
213. See sources cited supra note 204.
214. See Michael Ramsey, Acts of State and Foreign Sovereign Obligations, 39 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 1, 40-42 (1998) (observing that dispute resolution is especially useful in conflicts between
private parties and governments, including governments in developing countries).
215. Such initiatives have proven to be successful in other arenas such as in Japan’s dis-
bursement of ODA loans for environmental projects.  As part of the projects, Japanese corpo-
rations tailor technologies for a nation’s economic, cultural and social situations.  See Yukiko
Katsumi, Adaptability Key to Ecological Projects, THE DAILY YOMIURI, March 31, 1998, at 7,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File.
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A. Goals of a Cooperative Approach
The key to tailor-made adjustments of the intellectual property
fences in developing countries is rooted in the premise that any
transaction involving a significant transfer of technology is likely to
require both a local counterpart and government approval at the out-
set.  In this context, the relevant intellectual property standard ap-
pears to operate as a neutral ground rule, like other constant factors
in the domestic economic and legal situation that are common to all
business deals.  In reality, the abstract normative standard is, as we
have seen, encased in layers of uncertainty that, in more developed
countries, would have been reduced by a long history of judicial and
administrative precedents.216
The technology exporting firm thus needs ad hoc guarantees that
its expected gains from contractual relations with local counterparts
will not be vitiated by unforeseen complications due to gaps in the
law or other legal subtleties; to adverse regulations of which it was
unaware at the time of contracting; to practical inabilities to enforce
or defend its intellectual property rights, including its trade secrets,
before courts and administrators in a potentially hostile environment;
and to supervening changes of conditions demanded by governmental
authorities that were not party to the original deal or that have un-
dergone internal changes since then.217  For its part, the developing
country government wants to ensure that the technology in question
is not a waste of precious resources; that it is up-to-date and properly
rooted in the host country through appropriate training, spare parts,
and other forms of support; that it actually enhances the technical ca-
pabilities of the receiving country; that the conditions of transfer and
servicing are pro-competitive; and that admission of the foreign
transferor into the local economy will not turn out to be a “Trojan
horse” that weakens this or other sectors later on.218
What all the parties need is a tailor-made deal, facilitated by
neutral intellectual property rules, that provides positive sum gains
over and above those that might result from a more casual reliance
on intellectual property rights as such in more developed countries.219
216. See sources cited supra note 58.
217. See Martin, supra note 143.
218. Cf. Doris Estelle Long, The Protection of Information Technology in a Culturally Di-
verse Marketplace, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 129, 166 (noting that “today’s
technological break-through is tomorrow’s obsolescence.”).
219. Cf. Geller, supra note 17, at 114 (Arguing that one of the shortcomings of WTO dis-
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This approach entails more than the exercise of intellectual property
rights within parameters set by international law; it is “intellectual
property plus”—that  is, an effort to obtain the added value that re-
sults from coordinating the exercise of intellectual property rights
with other key economic variables, in selected transactions that en-
sure calculated gains for both private and public players.  The poten-
tial for such gains will be much greater under the TRIPS Agreement
than before.  This follows because foreign rightsholders enjoy specific
legal entitlements they can leverage and bargain around, while gov-
ernments in the technology-importing countries know that they must
increase foreign investment and expand their technological base by
honest means,220 in order to make up for diminishing returns from
copycat industries and from other foregone opportunities to free-ride
on investors in the developed countries.
Under these conditions, the players share a common interest in
resolving old intellectual property disputes and preventing new ones
that could adversely impact upon selected, reciprocally profitable
transactions, especially when those transactions are tied to direct or
indirect foreign investments.  If the host country wants these invest-
ments badly enough, it should be willing to provide a climate of legal
and regulatory stability in place of the uncertainty that otherwise
confronts foreign rightsholders.221  Contracts adjusting the holes in
the intellectual property fence to the needs of both foreign and do-
mestic firms thus make sense for both public and private actors, and
they can significantly reduce the transaction costs for all concerned.222
They can also help developing country governments to escape the pa-
ralysis likely to result when the enforcement of international intellec-
tual property standards appears to conflict with national develop-
ment goals or with powerful vested interests.223  Provided that these
governments take care to respect the MFN clause that the TRIPS
Agreement now applies to trade in knowledge goods, a cooperative
strategy would thus make it easier for them to accommodate the eco-
pute settlement procedures is that “the TRIPS decision-making powers are nonetheless subject
to a basic limitation.  TRIPS  panels will be focused on trade, while intellectual property laws,
though attuned to economic considerations, are motivated by other values as well.”).
220. See generally Sherwood, Intellectual Property Systems and Investment Stimulation, su-
pra note 143; sources cited supra note 70 and accompanying text.
221. See Sherwood, Intellectual Property Systems and Investment Stimulation, supra note
143, at 277; Martin, supra note 143.
222. See I. Trotter Hardy, Contracts, Copyright, and Preemption in a Digital World, 1 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 2, ¶ 46 (1995) (observing that contracts often involve lower transaction costs).
223. See sources cited supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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nomic realities of an integrated global market without publicly
pushing intellectual property protection farther than its constituents
are prepared to go.
B. Modeling a Cooperative Framework
A priori, one might imagine that the best vehicle for promoting
the cooperative strategies the authors envision would be a broad-
ranging state organ whose role within any given developing country
entailed more or less the same monitoring and mediatory powers at-
tributed to the Council for TRIPS within the WTO framework.
From an organizational standpoint, indeed, the complexities of the
post-TRIPS environment do seem to require even developed coun-
tries to charge some central agency with the responsibility for man-
aging intellectual property matters and to endow it with inter-agency
jurisdictional powers that cut across traditional administrative hierar-
chies.  This need for good management becomes imperative in the in-
formation age, as the constant flux of new technologies raise complex
intellectual property issues of such transcending economic impor-
tance that they disrupt the decision-making capacities of the existing
administrative apparatus.224
On closer analysis, however, it soon appears that a “National
Council for TRIPS” would not be the appropriate vehicle for ade-
quately implementing the kind of cooperative approach to the TRIPS
Agreement that the authors envision.225  All its operations would nec-
essarily partake of official deeds and policies with respect to intellec-
tual property matters, and it could not easily distinguish its position
with respect to single business transactions from public and often
controversial positions that pertain to overarching normative and
procedural issues.  Because it could never sufficiently distinguish its
role as economic actor from its policymaking functions, any such offi-
cial agency must lack the flexibility to exploit gaps in the law when
structuring particular deals, and it might gradually succumb to the
same internal tensions that inhibit or paralyze other agencies.226
Moreover, the neutrality of any “National Council for TRIPS” would
224. See generally McManis, supra note 202.
225. Besides being politicized, such a national council may also prove to be prohibitively
expensive.  See Amy E. Carroll, A Review of Recent Decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit: Comment: Not Always the Best Medicine: Biotechnology and the Global
Impact of U.S. Patent Law, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2433, 2467 (1995) (discussing the administrative
costs of implementing intellectual property laws).
226. Cf. Young, supra note 24 (emphasizing the importance of depoliticized institutions).
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be hard to sustain or guarantee over time, as pro- or anti-
protectionist forces struggled to capture it and align it with their own
point of view.227  This struggle could, in turn, undermine both the con-
fidence and trust of outside private negotiators, who must deal with
such an agency, and weaken its ability to guarantee and enforce con-
tractual bargains built around the TRIPS standards.
While the authors firmly believe that governments play an indis-
pensable role in structuring a cooperative approach, their role here
differs from that of the policymaking apparatus.  Rather, taking the
intellectual property policies adopted by a particular developing
country as givens, the role of government in securing a cooperative
approach is primarily that of economic actor, bound by the rule of
law, and secondarily that of mediator and guarantor of the bargained-
for outcomes.  As economic actors, government officials seeking to
enter into mutually beneficial transactions must be able to negotiate
with all the parties concerned, including foreign interests, local firms
(whether private or state enterprises), and all the relevant govern-
ment agencies.228  They must mediate among the conflicting interests
in the local environment and help to arrive at business arrangements
that will withstand scrutiny by the relevant government organs and
that will be strictly enforced by the local judiciary and administrative
authorities.  At the same time, the participation of state actors as
economic agents in negotiations with foreign rightsholders concern-
ing specific transactions must not compromise the larger policymak-
ing functions of the developing country’s political organs.  These enti-
ties continue to operate in a sovereign capacity above and beyond the
level at which state enterprise and government officials qua economic
actors surrender themselves to the rule of law.
The foregoing considerations suggest the need for a stable, on-
going private institution that could host transactional negotiations
bearing on intellectual property rights and act as a go-between in fa-
cilitating relations among foreign rightsholders, local enterprise, and
227. See Robert Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1314 (1996) (“[I]f someone else agrees
to pay the cost of supplying new institutions, it is difficult to overcome the temptation to free-
ride.  Then the problem for some appropriators is how to present the “facts” of the local situa-
tion in such a way that officials who may not know the local circumstances will be led to create
institutions that will leave some individuals better off than others.  Those individuals who have
the resources to enable them to make the best case to external officials are most likely to gain
rules (or exceptions to rules) that will advantage them most.”).
228. Cf. ROOT, supra note 23, at 66-74, 82-84 (discussing the role of the government in eco-
nomic development and using Malaysia as an example).
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government agencies.229  In this connection, it is worth noting that the
collection societies in many developed countries230 already perform
certain functions that are analogous to those the authors think proper
for such an institution to carry out.231  Collection societies bring to-
gether, and mediate between, the interests of, say, authors, publish-
ers, and users of intellectual property, and in some countries they
have a quasi-governmental status that makes them responsible to the
public at large.232  The collection societies vary considerably with re-
spect to their different fields of operation, moreover, and some of the
smaller ones, such as the Harry Fox Agency233 in the United States,
stand out for their propensity to facilitate low cost or standardized
private contracts built around baseline intellectual property rules.234
The collection society model teaches us the importance of trans-
actional stability and of maximizing the efficiencies that derive from
229. See Merges, supra note 227, at 1307 (“Private bargaining is therefore the only way in-
tellectual property can be transferred efficiently.”).
230. For example, in Canada, the Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of
Canada, Ltd. handles all of the performing rights royalties of recorded musical works and the
Canadian Musical Rights Reproduction Agency, Ltd. handles licensing of recorded musical
works.  In Brazil, The Central Bureau of Royalty Collection and Distribution (ECAD) collects
and distributes all royalties, as well as fixes royalty rates.  Sweden’s organizational system,
which is made up of private unions and professional organizations, is considered to be one of
the most efficient in the world.  See generally, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE (Melville Nimmer & Paul Edward Geller eds., 1988).  For more detailed descrip-
tions of collection societies in other nations, also see Patrick F. Liechti, The Collection of Copy-
right Royalties and the Federal Arbitral Commission in Switzerland, 34 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
USA 214 (1987), Walter Dilenz, The Copyright Tribunals in Austria, The Federal Republic of
Germany and Switzerland, 34 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 193 (1987), and Proceedings of the
Eighth Annual Conference on Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Latin America: Developed
Strategies, Alliances and Markets, 10 FLA. J. INT’L L. 1, 41-46 (1996).
231. See  Stanley M. Besen et al., An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 VA. L.
REV. 383, 408 (1992) (discussing the economic advantages of a collection society in terms of
transaction costs); Jay M. Fujitani, Controlling the Market Power of Performing Rights Socie-
ties: An Administrative Substitute for Antitrust Regulation, 72 CAL. L. REV. 103, 103-06 (1984)
(explaining how collection societies are structured in the context of performing rights); Merges,
supra note 227, at 1330-38 (focusing on ASCAP).
232. See Fujitani, supra note 231.
233. See The Harry Fox Agency Inc. (visited October 11, 1998) <http://www.nmpa.org/
hfa.html.> (providing general information on the Harry Fox Agency).
234. See Merges, supra note 227, at 1295 (“The lesson learned in a number of industries is
that privately established Collective Rights Organizations (CROs) will often emerge to break
the transactional bottleneck.  From patent pools to collective copyright licensing organizations
such as ASCAP and BMI, IPR owners in various industries have demonstrated the workability
of these private transaction mechanisms.  Indeed, these case studies uncover two distinct ad-
vantages of CROs: expert tailoring and reduced political economy problems.”); Fujitani, supra
note 231, at 112-13 (reviewing the economic advantages that the Harry Fox Agency model pro-
vides).
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repeat performances.235  In the raw state of affairs, each intellectual
property transaction affecting a given developed country must start
from scratch, and all the attendant risks and uncertainties must be
separately overcome for each transaction.  In contrast, a proper insti-
tutional framework for implementing a cooperative approach to
cross-border intellectual property transactions would obtain the nec-
essary commitments to negotiate in advance, and would deepen its
relations with both the public and private sectors over time.  Repeat
performance would thus make it a tool for lowering transaction costs,
reducing uncertainties, increasing trust and confidence and, when
necessary, resolving disputes.236  In time, its mediatory role may give
rise to standardized deals, useful precedents, and streamlined proce-
dures, without sacrificing its ability to address each transaction on its
own bottom, as the case requires.237
The collection society model also teaches a number of lessons
about things to avoid when structuring ongoing public-private initia-
tives to facilitate transnational intellectual property negotiations.
These societies often become cumbersome, rigid, bureaucratic, and
inflexible, all traits that would defeat the purpose of the institution
we are describing.238  Moreover, the collection societies are suscepti-
ble to being captured or manipulated by one or more of their con-
stituent groups, and some have been known to deviate from their
missions in order to pursue interests of  their own at the expense of
their members.239
A public-private forum to bargain around the TRIPS Agreement
must, instead, have no interest of its own other than that of facilitat-
ing positive-sum gains for all its clients.  While benefiting from repeat
performances and standardized solutions whenever possible, it needs
to bring public and private actors together within a neutral and flexi-
ble forum that is beholden to no one.240  The goals of the exercise are
235. See Besen et al., supra note 231, at 384 (“Collective administration of the copyrights of
a group of owners increases production efficiency” and provides incentives for cooperation).
236. See Merges, supra note 227, at 1299 (suggesting that such institutional structures have
the advantage of reflecting the expertise of industry insiders and are flexible enough to be
changed over time by participants).
237. See id. at 1319.
238. See generally Fujitani, supra note 231 (criticizing BMI and ASCAP).
239. For example, an established songwriter in ASCAP will receive more royalties than a
newly admitted one.  See Neville Miller, The NAB View, 11 AIR L. REV. 399, 403 (1940), cited
in Besen et al., supra note 231, at 395-96 (explaining that collection societies in the United
States are strictly regulated because of complaints of discrimination among members).
240. Cf. Abbott, supra note 21, at 398 (stating that in the field of intellectual property there
is a “critical need” for a policy neutral research and analysis source).
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precisely those outlined above: namely, it must seek to adjust the in-
tellectual property fences to the needs of everyday actors, by means
of its abilities to mediate disputes and encourage compliance with
bargained-for outcomes.  Above all, such an institution must be seen
by both public and private actors as an instrument for subjecting in-
tellectual property transactions to the same criteria of “good govern-
ance” that have otherwise distinguished the economic activities of the
more successful developing countries from their less successful coun-
terparts.241
C. Organizing a Forum for Public-Private Initiatives After the
TRIPS Agreement
Professor David Lange, joined by other principals, has estab-
lished an International Forum for Intellectual Property Initiatives
(IFIPI), at the Duke University Law School’s Center for Global In-
formation Technologies.  The Forum is intended to serve as a vehicle
for the kind of ongoing public-private initiatives the authors have de-
scribed above and is indeed, the occasion for their collaboration in
the preparation of this article; in addition, The Forum recognizes the
link between increased intellectual property stability in the emerging
economies of the world and the potential for increased foreign direct
investment.  The Forum’s efforts gained early support from intellec-
tual property officials in China and Vietnam as well as from private
enterprises interested in doing business in these countries.
Though the Forum’s project is by no means limited to the Pacific
Rim, its initial attention focused primarily on China, where consider-
able interest has been expressed in finding just such a neutral forum
in which transnational intellectual property problems could be dis-
cussed and mediated.  The first rounds of specific negotiations under
the Forum’s auspices took place at a Conference in Brussels in July,
1997, organized and presented by Duke’s Center for Global Informa-
tion Technologies and its several partners in the public-private initia-
tives project.242  Participants included senior representatives from all
major Chinese intellectual property agencies or bureaus (including
the People’s Supreme Court and the Customs Bureau), as well as
senior representatives of participating private enterprises.  An
241. See generally ROOT, supra note 23.
242. See David Lange, Foreword: Public-Private Initiation after TRIPS; Designing A Global
Agenda, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT. L. 1 (1998) (acknowledging those who participated in organ-
izing the Center for Global Information Technologies at Duke, and the Conference at which
The Forum was formally introduced).
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equally distinguished delegation from the Vietnamese Copyright Of-
fice also attended and participated as observers, as did executives
from numerous enterprises and institutions interested in the venture.
In general, the discussions between the participating Chinese of-
ficials and representatives of the participating companies fell into two
categories.  One concerned matters of general import affecting a par-
ticular industry’s interest in more secure or more favorable enforce-
ment of existing laws and regulations bearing on its future activities
in the Chinese market.243  The second category concerned company-
centered issues, which might also be of more general interest, but
which in any event invited resolution at a transaction-specific level.244
The negotiations were off-the-record and confidential, as were
also the identities of the private-sector participants; and the authors
will make no attempt to identify the participants or to summarize the
nature of the negotiations themselves in greater detail here.  But it is
fair to say that the discussions were spirited and productive, yet
lacking altogether in the kind of adversarial rancor that often attends
disputes grounded in international intellectual property issues.  It
seems no less fair to say that most of the parties left these negotiating
sessions with a greater appreciation for the concept of public-private
initiatives in practice.  The Forum continues to be involved in pursu-
ing negotiating initiatives of this kind, and intends to broaden the
ranks of its participants to include intellectual property and trade of-
ficials from South Asian, African, East European and Latin Ameri-
can countries as well.245
IV.  BARGAINING AROUND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: A
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
The authors believe that, in time, the Forum can help to neu-
tralize the cultural biases that have so far colored top-down imposi-
tion of international intellectual property standards.246  It can also
243. A pharmaceutical company, for example, sought clarification of certain regulations
falling under the jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Protection for Pharmaceuticals of
the China State Pharmaceutical Administration.
244. For example, a trademark proprietor urged new recognition in China for a famous
mark not presently protected for technical reasons; meanwhile, again for example, a chemical
company, proposing to make a substantial direct investment in China, sought secure assurances
that its technology would be protected against both trade secret and patent infringement.
245. For more on the Forum, including its mission statement, see infra Appendix.
246. See Long, supra note 218, at 154-62 (discussing cultural biases and how they color in-
tellectual property standards around the world); Geller, supra note 64, at 216 (demonstrating
the limits of the TRIPS Agreement in cross-cultural settings).
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serve as an instrument for converting the residual dependence of
these standards on territorial law into a strength, rather than a weak-
ness.  By facilitating cooperative strategies that enable interested par-
ties to bargain around the ambiguities and gaps in the TRIPS regime,
within the limits that its MFN clause permits, public-private initia-
tives can serve to reduce tensions and to give participating develop-
ing countries a greater short-term stake in the worldwide intellectual
property system.
The authors further believe that the Forum’s initiatives stand to
benefit both developed and developing countries.  On the one hand,
these ongoing negotiations can help developing countries to work out
a level playing field on which to reconcile intellectual property poli-
cies with competition law and with the drive for increased foreign in-
vestment.  On the other hand, they enable firms in the developed
countries to reach beyond the letter of the law as embodied in the
TRIPS Agreement, and to address more than “slam dunk” issues, es-
pecially issues arising from the uncertain treatment of the most
promising new technologies under the classical intellectual property
paradigms.  By helping to achieve a non-disruptive working consen-
sus among all the affected parties, these initiatives can limit the risks
to which both old and new players are exposed; avoid unbargained-
for obstacles and predatory behavior; and promote sectoral sharing
of the benefits of technological innovation on a global, rather than a
merely national or regional basis.
From a larger perspective, the authors believe that the coopera-
tive strategy these initiatives seek to foster is intimately bound up
with the need for “good governance” in the developing countries’
quest for successful market reforms.  Intellectual property rights al-
ready represent a delicate balance between regulatory policies that
limit competition and the efficiencies that free enterprise is known to
yield.  Every developing country has a stake in establishing a viable
national system of innovation that can reduce path-dependence, nar-
row the technology gap, and prod local enterprise to address the
global marketplace.247  Each developing country that treats the TRIPS
Agreement as a set of default rules to be bargained around, within
the limits that the Agreement provides, regains some of the negoti-
ating initiative that was lost during the multilateral trade negotiations
of the Uruguay Round.248  This, in turn, increases its power to convert
247. See Sherwood, Implications for Developing Countries, supra note 29.
248. See generally Ullrich, supra note 41.
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what might otherwise amount to short-term losses into palpable
gains.
Good governance in this context requires participating develop-
ing countries sharply to distinguish between their regulatory or poli-
cymaking functions and their operations qua economic actors in the
intellectual property arena.  As economic actors, agents of the state
implement the development policies that have been formulated with
respect to its own national system of innovation; but they also inter-
act with private and public actors in the global marketplace.  In
seeking to extract as many positive gains as it can from each transac-
tion, the state economic actor must also be bound by its own com-
mitments and the rule of law.
In this respect, the treatment of sovereign immunity in public in-
ternational law teaches valuable lessons that apply to the new world
of international intellectual property relations in the post-TRIPS en-
vironment.249  The authors refer to the willingness of states to allow
their commercial instrumentalities to be sued qua private actors for
transgressions of the various domestic laws, a practice that has re-
cently evolved into a settled exception to the standard doctrine of
sovereign immunity.250  While the obvious effect of this exception is to
require state enterprises to obey foreign commercial laws, it also
gives states an incentive to develop commercial policy on a transna-
tional basis that might otherwise be lacking under a regime of pure
sovereign immunity.251  In effect, compliance with foreign commercial
law strengthens the sovereign’s capacity to formulate and develop its
own commercial law on sounder, less parochial, foundations.
In the post-TRIPS environment, the dominant legal rules af-
fecting national intellectual property systems, though largely extra-
territorial in principle, are—as we have seen—open to widely varying
implementation policies and procedures in actual state practice.252  By
monitoring and filtering that implementation process through mutu-
ally agreed private transactions, the state as economic actor directly
249. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 322-36, 507-08 (4th ed.
1990) (explaining the doctrine of sovereign immunity).
250. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 480-81 (1983)
(ruling that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act did not bar a private party’s suit against a
state for commercial activities); Philip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order and Critical
Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 812 (1990) (“Foreign governments and enterprises have
also dramatically increased their commercial activities, rendering them accountable in Ameri-
can courts.”).
251. See Survey of International Law, 19 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 159 (1995).
252. See generally Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 11.
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or indirectly adjusts international standards to its own intellectual
property policies and sets the level of their enforcement.  In so doing,
it exploits the risks and uncertainties inherent in the WTO’s dispute-
settlement process, especially as that process affects developing coun-
tries, in order to extract concessions of clear benefit to its own eco-
nomic development strategies.  The cumulative effects of such indi-
vidual deals, spun out against the shadows cast by the TRIPS
Agreement, should transcend the borders of single developing coun-
tries and help to create a better worldwide balance between legal in-
centives to innovate and the need to preserve the conditions in which
free competition thrives.
We do not mean to overstate our case, either by denigrating the
strength of the TRIPS regime as adopted at Marrakesh, Morocco in
1994, or by underestimating the outer limits that its MFN clause im-
poses on the plausible range of public-private deal making.  Yet, the
MFN clause that applies to knowledge goods under a public law
treaty that regards intellectual property owners as third-party benefi-
ciaries is not the same MFN clause that the Contracting Parties have
applied to trade in tangible goods under the GATT.253  Trade experts
who fail to take these differences into account will miscalculate the
probable legal consequences of applying the MFN principle to inter-
national intellectual property rights and will underestimate the op-
portunities for states to cut deals with private companies, as distinct
from deals with other states.
The discretionary variables inherent in the application of intel-
lectual property paradigms, even in the most developed countries,
necessarily create a range of state practice and experience not rising
to the level of formal rules and procedures, on which each state re-
mains free to draw in the transnational context,254 so long as legal dis-
crimination against other states or their nationals does not result.255
Given equal access to the bargaining process, it will not be easy to
prove true discrimination on the basis of single transactions in which
intellectual property is but one of many commercial components.
Nor will international tribunals be eager to compromise the residual
territorial sovereignty of the bulk of the WTO’s membership.256
253. See Cottier, supra note 76, at 397-98 (noting that the rules in intellectual property con-
cern persons, while the GATT relates to products).
254. See U.S. v. India, supra note 18.  See generally Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 11.
255. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 3, 4.
256. See U.S. v. India, supra note 18; Reichman, Securing Compliance with the TRIPS
Agreement After U.S. v. India, supra note 18, at 592-97 (“Limits of the Rule of Law”).
FINALLANGE2.DOC 04/02/99  2:25 PM
64 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 9:11
Meanwhile, a mediatory framework, in which case-by-case in-
tellectual property transactions can be addressed through public-
private initiatives, represents an opportunity for preventing disputes
that might otherwise weaken the still embryonic foundation of the
WTO.257  While mediation has always been a basic instrument of in-
ternational relations, its potential role in the post-TRIPS environ-
ment is magnified by the risk that every dispute between private
firms in developed countries and their counterparts in developing
countries can escalate into a test case before the WTO’s dispute-
settlement panels, which even the Council for TRIPS seems power-
less to stay.258  If matters do proceed to litigation, the uncertain results
can vex comity and augment resentment and frictions that will un-
dermine the pacific enjoyment of intellectual property rights at a fu-
ture time.259  When, instead, such disputes are resolved or avoided by
mediation accepted as binding by the private firm, and also accepted
as binding by  the developing country (qua economic actor) with re-
spect to certain intellectual property commitments, that result will
indirectly advance the cause of intellectual property owners every-
where.
It follows that public-private initiatives that engage the state as
economic actor afford both developed and developing countries a
unique opportunity to define a workable intellectual property
framework that produces positive gains (and lower social costs) for
all concerned, including the international community as a whole.  No
comparable gains could emerge from purely private transactions that
remain subject to state scrutiny or from state-to-state negotiations
under the threat of coercion or retaliation.  What makes the IFIPI an
intriguing venture is precisely its ability to maximize flexibility by in-
sulating both the mediators and public and private negotiators from
outside influences.  Within its precincts, practical decisions having
profound policy implications can be worked out serenely, and with-
out recourse to formal, rigidifying declarations of official policy, or
worse yet, to litigation before the WTO’s dispute-settlement panels.
If the Forum succeeds, it will become a shop in which to forge
common-law and common sense solutions to transnational intellec-
tual property problems that might otherwise become intractable.  It
thus represents a potentially useful and, one hopes, efficient tool for
257. See generally Helfer, supra note 126 (noting that bringing controversial cases to the
WTO may undermine the WTO).
258. Cf. Bello, supra note 22; supra text accompanying notes 188-94.
259. See Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures, supra note 21, at 346-47, 561.
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achieving, step by step, a proper balance between incentives to create
and the preservation of the competitive ethos in an integrated global
market.  We hope you will agree that the Forum and its project merit
cultivation and support from both the public and private spheres con-
cerned with implementing international intellectual property rights in
the post-TRIPS environment.
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APPENDIX
MISSION STATEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FORUM
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INITIATIVES
The following outline reflects the initial organizing principles
under which the Forum’s project has gone forward to date.  Though it
must be emphasized that these principles are still quite fluid and
subject to change, they do represent a preliminary “mission state-
ment”:
Purpose
To promote improved intellectual property protection and in-
creased capital investment in the evolving economies of the world
through public-private initiatives (structured, on-going working
relationships between IP proprietors and their public sector
counterparts in the evolving economies)
Membership
Voting
By invitation, upon payment of dues:
• Intellectual property (and trade) officials in the evolving
economies
• Senior IP and investor management and professionals
interested in the global marketplace






• Project Development (revenue generating distance education,
conferences, etc.)
• Foundation support
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Organization
Oversight
Board of Directors nominated and elected by voting mem-
bers
Administration
Center for Global Information Technologies (Duke Law
School) pro tem; subject to funding out initial investment and
subsequent spin-off into free-standing independent organiza-
tion, with principal offices in New York, Brussels (or Ge-
neva), Buenos Aires and Hong Kong and continued educa-
tional link to Duke Law School
Goals
To design and implement more efficient post-TRIPS mechanisms
for securing adequate recognition, protection and enforcement of
IP rights (with resulting increases in capital investment) in the
evolving economies
First Five Years
• To secure adequate funding, participation and support
to insure survival
• To demonstrate the fundamental viability of the concept
and practice of “bargaining around TRIPS”
• To demonstrate the relationship between IP stability and
increased capital investment
Second Five Years
• To achieve substantially wider recognition and increased
support
Thereafter
• To achieve the full Goals of the enterprise
Operative Principles and Accords
Mutuality
Success depends upon the degree to which both public and
private parties consider themselves mutually obligated in
these respects:
Commitment
i.e., Commitment to the goals and processes of the enterprise
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Respect
The enterprise is voluntary by definition; a decent respect for
opposing parties is therefore a sine qua non
Confidence
Trust
Willingness to be Bound
Again, the success of a voluntary enterprise presupposes a
mutual willingness to live by the rules of the game
Equal Access to All Players in the Global Marketplace
The Forum must be available to IP (and related) officials in
all evolving economies (a proposal obviously requiring ad-
ditional definition); and to all private parties interested in in-
vesting in the evolving economies
Equal Treatment in Equal Circumstances
The MFN principles of the TRIPS Agreement (and other in-
ternational agreements) may need to be accommodated to the
realities of transaction-centered bargaining, but it is therefore
also absolutely essential that parties extend and receive equal
treatment in equal circumstances; when combined with the
principle of equal access (above), the fundamental purposes
of MFN are met
Integrity of Process
The process must be developed and participated in by all
parties so as to insure confidence in such attributes of integ-
rity as confidentiality, truth-telling, internal transparency,
consistency, and the like
Non-Waiver of Rights and Prerogatives
The parties initially must be secure in their [a priori rights]
and prerogatives under international and domestic laws; in
time, as confidence in the integrity of the process increases,
some adjustments may be made here, subject to approval by
the parties themselves
